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Occupational Fraud: Executive compensation and enforcements against auditors and 
perpetrators. 
Erlina Papakroni 
This dissertation is comprised of three studies that examine the association of executive 
compensation with financial statement fraud and enforcements pursued against the independent 
auditor and the principal perpetrators when occupational fraud is detected. 
The first study examines competing, though non-mutually exclusive, hypotheses for the 
path that equity compensation follows on its way to financial misreporting. We find that firms that 
experience financial statement fraud pay their executives higher levels and a higher proportion of 
equity compensation across the entire executive’s tenure. This starts in the first year of an 
executive’s tenure and continues up until the fraud period. These findings hold across executive 
roles and pay rank. We find some evidence that executives who perpetrate fraud have idiosyncratic 
compensation preferences and negotiate different pay packages compared to other executives in 
the same firm. We find this only for option grants during the latter years of executive tenure. 
Finally, we find differences in how executives who perpetrate fraud manage their portfolios. They 
sell far less of their accumulated equity during their tenure than other executives in the same firm 
who do not perpetrate fraud. 
The second study examines whether the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission’s auditor 
related findings, namely charged, silent or concealed, are associated with fraud scheme 
characteristics, as argued under an outcome-penalty accountability framework. The results indicate 
a weak association between the fraud characteristics and the SEC’s auditor related findings. 
Collusion among perpetrators and asset misreporting fraud schemes increase the probability of the 
SEC charging the auditor, as compared to the probability of being silent. Whereas the perpetrator’s 
executive position decreases the probability of the SEC charging the auditor, as compared to the 
probability of being silent. Overall, only a few fraud characteristics affect the SEC’s auditor related 
findings, which is not consistent with the outcome-penalty accountability framework. In contrast, 
the auditor type, being a Big-N auditor or not, significantly affects the SEC’s findings. The SEC 
is more likely to remain silent or find that the fraud scheme is concealed for Big-N than non-Big-
N auditors, as compared to charging the auditor. Thus, this evidence is more consistent with a 
process-reward accountability framework.  
Lastly, study three examines the impact of fraud severity and the perpetrator’s status and 
organization type on the victim organization’s outcomes pursued against the principal perpetrator. 
We find that as fraud severity increases, the severity of the outcome pursued against the principal 
perpetrator increases as well. Supporting status characteristics theory, we also show that 
perpetrators of different social statuses receive differing levels of punishment. Specifically, victim 
organizations pursue less severe outcomes against a perpetrator with a high status as compared to 
a perpetrator with a low status when the duration of the fraud is short. As the fraud duration 
increases, however, victim organizations pursue equally severe outcomes against all perpetrators. 
Lastly, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held organizations are more likely to pursue no 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Occupational fraud has serious consequences to individuals and/or organizations 
perpetrating the fraud schemes. Regarding individual consequences, Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson and Neal (2010), in analyzing public companies charged with fraudulent financial 
reporting from 1998 to 2007 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), found that 
in total $2.74 billion in civil fines and $2.65 billion in disgorgement were imposed on individuals 
allegedly involved. Further, individuals involved can experience high employment turnover, 
criminal indictments and convictions. Similar consequences are identified by Karpoff, Lee and 
Martin (2008b) where 93.4 percent of culpable individuals lost their jobs, 31 percent were barred 
from future employment by the SEC and 28 percent suffered criminal violations with sentences 
varying on average from 4.3 years in jail and 3 years in probation. Organizations receive severe 
consequences as well. The most immediate and prominent cost is stock price drop by an abnormal 
16.7 percent within two days of fraud disclosure in the press and 7.3 percent within two days of 
the fraud investigation announcement by the SEC or the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Beasley et 
al. 2010).  Additionally, Karpoff, Lee and Martin  (2008a) estimated that for every fraudulent 
dollar, the firm losses that dollar plus an additional $3.08. Most of the additional costs results from 
the lost reputation, $2.71, and the remaining part of $0.36 is the result of expected legal penalties. 
Despite these severe consequences, occupational fraud still prevails.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed light into understanding the factors that allow or 
prevent fraudsters from perpetrating fraud. Chapter 2 examines executive compensation incentives 
in fraudulent firms, or lack of such incentives in control firms. Prior literature documents a positive 
association between executives’ incentive compensation and financial misreporting but has not 
examined why executives in the misreporting firms have stronger equity incentives or how the 
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compensation differences arise to the point where some executives manipulate the financial 
statements. This chapter provides insights into the changes of executive compensation packages, 
preceding the disclosure of financial statement fraud (FSF). For the period leading to FSF 
disclosure, this study examines whether executive compensation packages in fraud firms differ 
from the control firms, whether executives within fraud firms receive different compensation 
packages, and whether executives within fraud firms manage their portfolio overtime. We use 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC as a proxy for 
financial statement fraud. We collect compensation data from Compustat’s Execucomp database 
and supplement this data with hand collection from definitive proxy statements (filing DEF 14A). 
Other data used in our analyses are collected from Compustat and CRSP. We find strong evidences 
that misreporting firms pay their executives higher levels of equity compensation on average over 
entire executive’s tenure. The difference in stock options granted to executives at fraud firms is 
greater than the difference in base salary, bonuses, and restricted stock grants combined across all 
years of their tenure. Further, when analyzing executive-level pay differences within misreporting 
firms, we find that executives who perpetrate fraud negotiate different levels of equity 
compensation compared to presumably innocent executives across their total tenure. Lastly, we 
find strong evidence that within misreporting firms, named executives retain a significantly higher 
percentage of their equity-based compensation than non-named executives, in total. The evidence 
indicates that how executives manage their portfolios influences the future reporting risk 
regardless of how firms choose to compensate their executives. 
Chapter 3 examines fraud preventing factors related to independent auditors. Independent 
auditors are important gatekeepers in preventing publicly traded companies from misreporting 
their financial statements. The quality of the audit that the independent auditor provides is affected 
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by the enforcements of the regulatory entities. Prior literature examines the U.S. Security and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcements, and argue that sometimes the SEC charges the 
auditor, and sometimes does not charge the auditor for auditing violations. Yet, evidence shows 
that, when the auditor is not charged, the SEC either finds that the fraud scheme is concealed from 
the auditor or remains silent regarding the auditor when there is no such finding. This chapter 
examines the enforcements issued by the SEC against the independent auditors for failing to detect 
fraud, namely charged, silent or concealed. Peecher, Solomon and Trotman (2013) argues two 
accountability frameworks, namely outcome-penalty framework and process-reward framework. 
The outcome-penalty accountability framework argues that the SEC’s auditor related findings are 
associated with fraud schemes characteristics, and independent auditors are penalized based on 
their audit procedure outcomes. Whereas, the process-reward accountability framework argues 
that independent auditors are rewarded based on their audit process regardless of the audit 
outcome. Overall, only a few fraud characteristics affect the SEC’s auditor related findings, which 
is not consistent with the outcome-penalty accountability framework. In contrast, the auditor type, 
being a Big-N auditor or not, significantly affects the SEC’s findings. Big-N auditors are argued 
to provide better quality audits in prior studies. Thus, this evidence is more consistent with a 
process-reward accountability framework.  
Lastly, chapter 4 examines outcomes perpetrators face from the victim organizations as a 
fraud deterrence factor. When occupational fraud is detected, the organization—the victim to the 
fraud case—decides whether to pursue no outcome, to terminate, or to terminate and criminally 
prosecute the principal perpetrator. We use ACFE survey data to examine the impact of fraud 
severity and the perpetrator’s status and organization type on the victim organization’s decisions 
in pursuing an outcome against the principal perpetrator. We examine whether perpetrator status 
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characteristics and victim organization type interact with fraud scheme severity to affect outcome 
severity in occupational fraud cases. Each of these elements has previously been shown to be 
associated with punishment severity, but no prior study has examined the interaction of the three 
in white-collar crime. We find that as fraud severity increases, the severity of the outcome pursued 
against the principal perpetrator increases as well. However, victim organizations pursue less 
severe outcomes against high status perpetrators, as compared to low status perpetrators in fraud 
cases with a short duration. As the fraud duration increases, however, victim organizations pursue 
equally severe outcomes against all perpetrators. Lastly, different organization types pursue 
different outcomes for similar fraud acts. We conclude that the fraud outcome is determined not 
only by the severity of the fraud act, but also by the status of the perpetrator who committed the 
fraud and the type of the victim organization.  
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 through chapter 4 present 
the three studies briefly introduced in this chapter, and chapter 5 provides a summary of 
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1.0.  INTRODUCTION 
Many empirical studies document a positive association between incentives from an 
executive’s firm-based wealth and financial misreporting. These studies have examined different 
proxies for equity incentives, different types of financial misreporting, and different executive 
roles, and they have employed various econometric techniques. Thus far, the literature has not 
examined why executives in the misreporting firms have stronger equity incentives or how the 
compensation differences arise to the point where some executives within the firm manipulate the 
firm’s financial statements. We look to fill this void and explore competing, though non-mutually 
exclusive, hypotheses for the path that equity compensation follows on its way to financial 
misreporting. 
We consider three explanations for the hypothesized positive association between equity-based 
compensation and financial misreporting. The first is that future misreporting firms unilaterally 
choose or need to offer higher equity compensation to prospective hires. Board of directors in these 
misreporting firms may have specific strategies and preferences for risk, and they want to pursue 
and pay their executives accordingly. Alternatively, these firms may need to offer high powered 
equity incentives to attract talent. This suggests that under either scenario these firms pay all their 
executives a higher level and/or proportion of equity compensation throughout their tenure at the 
firm. Thus, initially we examine compensation differences between misreporting and control firms 
for all executives during their entire tenure with the respective firm. 
Most prior research in this area has concentrated on CEO equity incentives, but recent papers 
have begun to distinguish between executive roles. For instance, Feng, Ge, Luo and Shevlin (2011)  
find that equity incentives are positively related to misreporting for CEOs but not for CFOs. Jiang, 
Petroni and Wang (2010)  find the opposite result, a positive association for CFOs and no 
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association for CEOs. Davidson (2018) finds that within misreporting firms those executives 
named by the SEC as fraud perpetrators have stronger equity incentives than other presumably 
innocent executives at the same firm regardless of their role. This suggests that differences in 
equity incentives across executives in the same firm could be related to reporting risk in addition 
to or instead of differences in pay preferences at the firm level. Thus, next, we examine 
compensation differences between misreporting and control firms for CEO and non-CEO 
executives in each of the first 10 years of their tenure with the respective firms.  
The next two explanations we consider address within-firm differences in equity incentives 
across executives1. The second explanation is that executives who perpetrate fraud have different 
compensation preferences and negotiate pay packages with higher levels or ratios of equity 
compensation. Compensation is a negotiation between the firm and the individual; as such, at the 
executive level, the employee will often have the ability to negotiate higher pay or a different mix 
of base and incentive-based pay (Murphy 2013). Under this explanation, we examine 
compensation differences between executives who are named and executives who are not named 
as fraud perpetrators by the SEC. Compensation differences are examined for the entire tenure and 
for each individual year for the first 8 years of the executive’s tenure with the fraud firm.  
The third explanation is that regardless of across or within firm pay differences, executives 
who perpetrate reporting fraud have strong equity incentives because of how they manage their 
portfolio over time. Many managers hold much of their wealth in their firm’s stock (Armstrong, 
Core and Guay 2015) , but there is substantial variation across executives. If certain executives 
                                                          
1  Another possibility, that fraud is perpetrated by executives with higher tenure and greater equity incentives, strictly 
because of tenure differences, does not appear likely. The Report to the Nations finds that percentage of frauds 
committed by executives in their first 5 years of tenure is nearly the same as the percentage committed by executives 
after their fifth year at the job (50.6% to 49.4% respectively). Additionally, we either control for tenure or compare 
compensation at the same point during tenure to address the impact that tenure has on compensation. 
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rarely divest themselves of equity-based compensation, then over time the value of their firm-
based wealth and any incentives it creates will grow regardless of firm or executive specific 
compensation differences. Therefore, we examine whether differences in how executives, within 
fraud firms, manage their equity portfolios are associated with the misreporting risk. These 
differences are examined, in total, for all executive tenure years after year 5.  
We find strong evidences that misreporting firms pay their executives higher levels of equity 
compensation on average over entire executive’s tenure. On average, CEOs (non-CEOs) at fraud 
firms are paid an additional $3.6 million ($900,000) per year, with 50 (65) percent of that attributed 
to stock options. The difference in stock options granted to executives at fraud firms is greater than 
the difference in base salary, bonuses, and restricted stock grants combined across all years of their 
tenure. When examining each tenure year individually, this difference is significant, beginning in 
the first year of an executive’s tenure, and it grows throughout their tenure at the firm. These results 
hold regardless of the executive’s role and hold also for executives who left the firm years before 
the misreporting period. In summary, irrespective of the time, role, or tenure, eventual 
misreporting firms are paying their executives higher equity compensation, which is one potential 
source of the documented positive association between equity incentives and misreporting. 
When analyzing executive-level pay differences within misreporting firms, we find some 
evidence that executives who perpetrate fraud negotiate different levels of equity compensation 
compared to presumably innocent executives across their total tenure. Specifically, we find that 
named executives are awarded approximately $900,000 more in stock options over their total 
tenure than non-named executives in the same firm, but this difference is largely determined by 
differences during the latter years of their tenure (years 6-8). When considering annual pay 
differences separately for each tenure year, we find no difference in any year for salary, bonus, or 
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restricted stock grants between named and non-named executives. However, we find that named 
executives are awarded significantly larger stock option grants in 4 out of 8 years of their tenure. 
We interpret these findings as evidence that differences between fraud and non-fraud firms are 
driven by both firm-level and executive-level compensation preferences, but that cross-sectional 
differences in pay are larger and more robust than within-firm differences in pay. 
Finally, we find strong evidence that within misreporting firms, named executives retain a 
significantly higher percentage of their equity-based compensation than non-named executives, in 
total, for all executive tenure years after year 5. Given that executives hired externally generally 
have not previously held stock, we do not examine portfolio management during the earliest years 
of tenure, however we find evidence that named insiders sell a lower percentage of their equity, 
starting in the sixth year of their tenure and as the fraud period approaches. The evidence indicates 
that how executives manage their portfolios influences the future reporting risk regardless of how 
firms choose to compensate their executives. 
In sum, we find at least some evidence for three distinct explanations, that could lead to a 
positive association between equity incentives and misreporting – that misreporting firms prefer 
to pay their executives differently, that executives who perpetrate fraud negotiate contracts with a 
higher level of option grants, and that executives who perpetrate fraud diversify themselves less 
and manage their portfolios differently from other executives. The results suggest that actions by 
both the firm and the executives contribute to an environment where misreporting is more likely, 
and that pay practices by themselves may not significantly increase the fraud risk level if certain 
portfolio practices by executives are absent. The results are of interest to regulators, board of 
directors, investors, and managers who should consider how effective changes to compensation 
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mix or levels impact reporting risk when there are no changes in how some executives manage 
their portfolios. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and 
develops testable hypotheses, Section 3 discusses the same and provides summary statistics, 
Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2.0. RELATED LITERARURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
2.1 Executive compensation 
Top executives’ total compensation has increased rapidly over the past 30 years (Frydman and 
Jenter 2010), and the increase has been considerably higher than inflation, at times (Goergen and 
Renneboog 2011). Not only total compensation, but the composition of compensation packages 
has changed as well. Most common executive compensation packages include base salary, annual 
bonus, stock and stock options, insurance, pensions benefits, and severance pay (Bushman, 
Indjejikian and Smith 1996). Over the past 30 years, base salary has accounted for a steadily 
decreasing percentage of executive total pay, whereas stock options have accounted for a steadily 
increasing percentage (Goergen and Renneboog 2011). The use of equity-based compensation for 
the top executives rose dramatically in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The median CEO wealth 
determined by the stock market performance of the firm tripled between 1980 and 1994, and then 
it doubled again between 1994 and 2000 (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Hall and Liebman 
1998). Prior studies find that equity accounts for most of the executive’s compensation. For 
instance, Armstrong et al. (2015) examine a sample of US CEOs from 1994 to 2010 and find that 
on average the CEO holds about $41.7 million of equity in the organization. Executive 
compensation is constantly changing in response to the economic and political environments 
(Murphy 2013). The main purpose of these changes is to address the agency problem by aligning 
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upper management equity incentives with the interest of shareholders in the organization. Yet, 
there is an ongoing debate in the corporate governance literature whether, at the current state, 
executive compensation is addressing or causing the agency problem.  
The two opposing views on executive compensation, in the corporate governance literature, 
are the efficient contracting view and the managerial power view (Murphy 2013). Under the 
efficient contracting view, executive compensation is viewed as the market mechanism that aligns 
shareholders’ and executives’ interests (Goergen and Renneboog 2011) through its incentive 
components (i.e. stock and stock options), which expose executives to compensation risk through 
stock price movement (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). This view maintains that incentives are 
structured to optimize firm value (Murphy 2013). The organization’s financial performance is 
associated with stock price movements. Higher stock prices translate into higher compensation for 
the executives. Therefore, executives are incentivized to increase firm value, which aligns with 
shareholders’ interests, in order to increase their compensation. In contrast, the managerial power 
view argues that executive compensation provides opportunity for managers to extract rents from 
shareholders (Goergen and Renneboog 2011) by manipulating the stock prices through reported 
earnings (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). Executives are strongly incentivized to manipulate 
the financial statements to either maintain or to increase the stock price in order not to risk their 
compensation. Further, under this view, the level and the composition of the compensation are 
determined by powerful executives, not by the competitive market forces (Murphy 2013). Prior 
studies find that executives exercise significant power on governance mechanisms when 
negotiating the level and the composition of their compensation.  
These two opposing views stem from the ongoing debate whether the executive compensation 
is the cause or the solution of the agency problem, i.e. the separation of ownership and 
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management. The incentive components of the compensation are the solution to the agency 
problem, as management’s interest is aligned with the shareholders’ interest in increasing the firm 
value. Yet, setting the level and the composition of these incentives causes the agency problem. 
The shareholders engage the board of directors and other governance mechanisms to protect their 
interest in the organization (Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006). Thus, the agency problem pertains 
not only between the shareholders and the top executives, but also between the shareholders and 
the board of directors. The board of directors are elected by the shareholders to monitor, hire, fire, 
and set compensation for the top executives (Murphy 2013). Occasionally, the board of directors 
appoint compensation committees to set executive compensation. Also, they hire compensation 
consultants to assist them in designing compensation packages (Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 
2010). Several studies find that these entities do not always act in the best interests of the 
shareholders, and the outside directors do not suffer significant wealth and reputational penalties 
in those cases (Beneish, Marshall and Yang 2017). Hence, the top executives have significant 
bargaining power in setting their compensation level and composition. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2011) state that the boards of directors as well as their compensation 
committees are not effective corporate governance mechanisms, and there are several reasons cited 
in the literature.  First, although on average the boards of directors consist of 80 percent of outside 
directors, and half of the time the CEO is the only inside director on the board, the CEO influences 
the director’s nomination process (Murphy 2013). The directors are elected by the shareholders 
but are often selected by the CEO (Murphy 2013). As such, the directors are unlikely to challenge 
the CEO’s compensation (Goergen and Renneboog 2011). Second, the CEO is not only involved 
in the hiring process of the directors, but also in setting their compensation, and Brick et al. (2006) 
find a positive association between the CEO’s compensation and the directors’ compensation. The 
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authors further explain that the CEO overcompensates the directors in exchange for a less stringent 
monitoring, in a “mutual back scratching” relationship. At the same time, the directors are willing 
to over-compensate the top executives since they are using the shareholders’ money and not their 
own (Murphy 2013). Third, the executives and directors share important social ties through serving 
together in other boards, working together in the past, or through other social events, such as golf 
outings, business roundtable meetings, serving in the same charitable organizations, etc. (Fracassi 
and Tate 2012). Hwang and Kim (2009) find that in only 62 percent of their sample, a director did 
not have any financial, familial, or social ties to the CEO or to the firm. Firms with boards that 
lack all these three ties award a lower level of compensation and exhibit stronger pay-performance 
sensitivity and stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards lack financial 
and familial ties but have social ties. Also, Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that the intensity of board 
monitoring is weakened in the organization where the CEO has prior ties the board members.  
Prior literature finds shortcomings about compensation consultants as well. Compensation 
consultants assist organizations in setting and designing an executive compensation contract and 
offer several other services, such as accounting, tax and regulatory issues related to executive pay, 
and various human resources and actuarial services (Murphy and Sandino, 2010) . Working closely 
with the management, not the board of directors, the compensation consultants face a conflict of 
interest in pleasing the management, by recommending excessive compensation in exchange for 
repetitive business and cross selling other services (Murphy and Sandino 2010). Cadman et al. 
(2010) fail to find an association between the compensation consultant’s conflict of interest and 
the CEO’s excessive pay, whereas Murphy and Sandino (2010) do find that the CEO’s pay is 
higher in companies where the consultants provide other services.  
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2.2 Equity incentives and financial misreporting 
Accounting research has been concerned with the reasons why equity compensation not only 
fails to align principals’ and agents’ interests (as initially introduced by Jensen and Meckling, 
1976)  , but is also considered a source of the divergence in principals’ and agents’ interests. For 
instance, Jensen (2005) asserts that equity-based compensation fails to address the agency problem 
when the firm’s equity is overvalued. As executives’ pay and wealth compensation depend on 
overvalued stock, they have strong incentives to maintain overvaluation2. 
Prior research has extensively analyzed the association between the financial misreporting and 
executive compensation. The financial misreporting has been measured using proxies for earnings 
management (abnormal accruals, meet/beat earnings forecasts), accounting restatements, and 
litigated cases of financial statement fraud. The executive compensation has been measured using 
components of pay, often focusing on performance-based pay (stock options, restricted stock, 
bonuses) or the sensitivity of firm-based wealth to stock prices (portfolio delta, vega). The findings 
generally document a positive association between CEO’s equity incentives3 and earnings 
management (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005), accounting 
restatements (Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Farber 2008), and accounting fraud (Feng et al. 
2011; Denis et al. 2006).  
Recent evidence suggests that this association exists cross-sectionally among fraud and non-
fraud firms and within misreporting firms across executives. Feng et al. (2011) find that CEOs, 
rather than CFOs in the misreporting firms, have significantly higher equity incentives than control 
                                                          
2 Overvaluation can occur absent or prior to any manipulation of financial statements, legal or illegal, on the part of 
management. 
3 Prior research has examined the association between cash bonuses and misreporting but generally has failed to find 
significant results (Efendi et al. 2007; Harris and Bromiley 2007). Results in the literature are generally significant for 
incentives created from the total firm-based wealth and not for components of the current year compensation. 
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firms. Davidson (2018) finds that the executives who perpetrate the misreporting scheme have 
higher equity incentives than non-perpetrating executives within the firm, regardless of an 
executive role. The evidence thus far indicates statistically significant differences in executives’ 
equity incentives between financial misreporting firms and control firms.  
However, there are two gaps in the established association that the accounting literature has 
yet to address. First, this association is primarily documented only for the year prior to the first 
misreported year. For instance, Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007) find that the ratio of  in-
the-money options held by the CEO to the CEO’s salary changes from 46.2 to 15.3, in the year 
before and after the misstatement, respectively, while the same change is not observed in control 
firms. But incentives from firm-based wealth generally need to accrue over a number of years. 
RTTN (2016) reports that 49.4 percent of frauds are committed by individuals who have been at 
the firm for more than 5 years. Currently, there is a void in the extant literature in examining 
compensation differences between misreporting and control firms over the executives’ tenure. 
Thus, there is little research on when or in what ways misreporting firms diverge from control 
firms regarding the executive compensation over the perpetrator’s tenure. Second, there is still 
little consistent evidence regarding equity incentives and misreporting for non-CEOs. Davidson 
(2018) reviewed 18 studies that examined executive compensation and financial misreporting, and 
only 2 of those studies examined the compensation of non-CEO executives.   
Prior research has more consistently found evidence of an association between financial 
misreporting and incentives from accumulated firm-based wealth as opposed to components of 
current period compensation4. This literature has not yet examined how perpetrators accumulated 
                                                          
4 Prior research has examined changes in compensation packages following the revelation of financial misreporting. 
Cheng and Farber (2008) find a significant shift in compensation from options to salary after the revelation of 
accounting issues. Further, they find evidence that stock option grants are increasing during the misstatement period. 
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their firm-based wealth and whether it is the outcome of firm-level compensation preferences, 
whether individual executives who perpetrate fraud have idiosyncratic compensation preferences 
and negotiate different pay packages, or whether differences in equity levels are caused not by 
compensation differences, but by executives divesting themselves of previously granted equity at 
significantly different rates. We develop three hypotheses, one for each of the three potential 
explanations.  
While differences in firm-based wealth are affected by tenure and portfolio management, it is 
possible that firms offer similar annual compensation contracts to all senior executives. Prior 
studies analyzing misreporting and CEO equity incentives often find similar results when 
analyzing average equity incentives across the top 5 paid executives. Additionally, Jiang et al. 
(2010) find that firms that provide strong equity incentives for their CFOs tend to provide strong 
equity incentives throughout the organization. Given the evidence that fraud firm executives have 
strong equity incentives and that firms have specific compensation preferences, we propose the 
following hypothesis, stated in null form:  
H1: Misreporting firms do not offer greater equity incentives to their top-five paid 
executives than do control firms.  
Prior research also suggests within-firm differences in equity incentives and that these 
differences are associated with reporting risk. Jiang et al. (2010) find evidence that CFO equity 
incentives are positively associated with misreporting but fail to find an association between CEO 
equity incentives and financial misreporting. In contrast, Feng et al. (2011) find no evidence of an 
association between CFO equity incentives and financial misreporting but do find a positive 
association between CEO equity incentives and misreporting. In comparing equity incentives 
within the misreporting firms, Davidson (2018) finds that executives, who the SEC identifies as 
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perpetrators of fraud, have stronger equity incentives than non-perpetrators. Given prior findings 
regarding executive’s ability to negotiate preferred pay packages and differences in equity 
incentives within fraud firms across executives, we consider the possibility that executives who 
perpetrate financial statement fraud negotiate pay packages with higher levels of stock or option 
grants, compared to other executives in the same firm. This leads to our second hypothesis, stated 
in null form: 
H2: Executives named as perpetrators in misreporting firms do not have higher equity 
compensation than non-named executives in the same misreporting firms. 
Armstrong et al. (2015) find that executives hold far more equity than it is required by explicit 
or implicit contracts but also document a significant variation in the level of equity that executives 
hold. Most executives will eventually sell some of their accumulated equity for liquidity, 
diversification, or other reasons. Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012)  analyze insiders’ trading 
behavior and find that insiders who trade regularly in the same month every year are more likely 
trading for liquidity or diversification purposes while those who trade regularly with no identifiable 
pattern are more likely making informed trades for the purpose of profiting off their information 
advantage. Kallunki, Kallunki, Nilsson and Puhakka (2018)  find differences in the executives’ 
trading behavior based on their wealth.  
Prior research documents a significant variation in equity holdings and insider trading across 
executives. Many prior studies examining the relation between financial misreporting and equity 
incentives measure equity incentives using some measure of wealth sensitivity to stock price (e.g. 
portfolio delta and vega). These measures are not compensation variables per se as executives are 
paid in stock and options, not in deltas and vegas; they are proxies for incentives from total firm-
based wealth, which is equal to accumulated equity compensation from which any divestments, 
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that the executive has made over their entire tenure (multiplied by stock price), has been deducted. 
Executives may accumulate and maintain strong equity incentives because of how they are paid or 
because of how they manage their portfolios. Thus, it is possible that any association between 
equity incentives and misreporting is not driven by particularly high levels of equity compensation 
but by particularly low levels of divestiture by executives after the fact. This leads to our third 
hypothesis, stated in null form: 
H3: Executives in misreporting firms do not manage their firm-based wealth differently 
from executives in control firms.  
In sum, an association between equity incentives and misreporting could exist because certain 
firms prefer paying their managers with higher levels of equity, certain executives prefer and 
negotiate pay with higher levels of equity, and certain executives manage their portfolios in a way 
that causes a variation. The existing theory predicting an association between equity incentives 
and misreporting makes no distinction as to the generation of relatively high levels of equity 
incentives, nor has the course been identified in empirical research. 
It is also important to emphasize that it is well documented that financial misreporting occurs 
over time. Beasley et al. (2010), in the second COSO report 1998-2007, report that the average 
fraud period extends to 31.4 months, with a median of 24 months. In the first COSO report, 1987 
– 1999, the average and median duration was slightly shorter: 23.7 and 21 months respectively. 
RTTN (2016) reports approximately the same median duration of 18 months, with a duration range 
from a couple of months up to more than 60 months. About 55% of the fraud cases in their sample 
lasted more than 12 months. Regarding restatements, Kedia and Philippon (2009)  find that the 
average number of the restated period is 5 financial quarters, with a range from 1 to 60 quarters 
restated. Furthermore, executives have a tenure of several years with the misreporting firms. In a 
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sample of 427 restating firms during the period 1993-2007, CEOs that were fired had a mean 
tenure of 6.6 years, whereas the CEOs that were retained had a mean tenure of 11.3 years (Beneish 
et al. 2017). Equity incentives are predicted to increase over the CEO’s tenure because as their 
initial performance uncertainty decreases over the years, it is possible to impose a higher incentive 
risk, ceteris peribus (Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 2006).   
It is uncertain how equity compensation and its association to financial misreporting changes 
over the executive tenure. Given the several month-duration of the financial misreporting and the 
executives’ multi-year tenure, we argue that differences in firm-based wealth between executives 
at fraud versus control firms take several years to become pronounced, could begin at various 
levels during executive tenure, and are caused by a combination of firm-based compensation 
preferences, idiosyncratic executive compensation preferences, and idiosyncratic executive 
portfolio management practices. Hence, we examine executive compensation differences 
separately for each executives’ tenure year with the misreporting firm.  
3.0 SAMPLE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
3.1 Sample 
We use Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC as a 
proxy for financial statement fraud. These releases summarize investigations the SEC brings 
against firms and/or executives for violations of SEC and Federal rules. To collect the sample, we 
read AAERs 84 – 3,916 which were released between January 15, 1986 and December 12, 2017. 
Firms are only included when the following can be determined: whether the firm’s financial 
statements are materially misstated; the year the violation began; and the names of those who 
committed the fraud. 
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Karpoff, Koester, Lee and Martin (2017) compare and note differences among numerous 
proxies used for misreporting. We chose to use the AAERs because several of our tests compare 
executives within a manipulation firm based on whether the individual was involved in 
perpetrating the fraud. AAERs are the only proxy that regularly provides this information. One 
limitation is that we assume the SEC accurately identifies perpetrators in fraud cases. This potential 
limitation introduces bias in our analyses only if the SEC intentionally charges individuals because 
they have high levels of equity. There is little evidence that individuals are wrongly named in 
AAERs and given the reputation and legal cost to the SEC for fining and/or jailing innocent 
executives, we assume that the SEC exercises extreme diligence before naming executives and 
imposing severe penalties on them. There is significant variation in the number of executives 
named in a given fraud case as well as significant variation in the roles of named parties. This 
suggests that the SEC is not simply naming and pursuing cases against executives in the same role 
in each firm but is investigating those executives for which there is strong evidence of their 
involvement. 
Table 2 - 1 provides statistics on the AAER fraud firms in our sample. During the collection 
period there were 3,815 AAERs issued5. Of those, we are able to match 392 firms to Compustat 
and CRSP and collect compensation data during years before the manipulation period67. 
Compensation data are available for 2,903 executives at AAER firms, many of whom left the firm 
before the manipulation period began. Finally, compensation data is available for 627 executives 
who are named by the SEC in an AAER as a perpetrator of accounting fraud. 
                                                          
5 As noted in prior studies, many AAERs are for matters unrelated to accounting fraud, and firms often have multiple 
AAERs associated with a single event. 
6 5 AAER firms with frauds related to earnings/asset understatement are excluded from the final sample. 
7 Some firms do not have compensation data available in the year immediately preceding the manipulation period, but 
data is available in earlier years to analyze compensation practices at different points during executive tenure. 
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[Insert Table 2 - 1 here] 
3.2 Summary statistics 
We collect compensation data from Compustat’s Execucomp database and supplement this 
data with hand collection from definitive proxy statements (filing DEF 14A), available from the 
SEC for fraud firms not included in Execucomp8. Other data used in our analyses are collected 
from Compustat and CRSP, and data sources are provided in the Appendix. 
Table 2 - 2 presents mean and median values for executive-level variables across fraud and 
non-fraud firms. We present data for CEOs and other top 5 paid executives. Fraud firm CEOs have 
significantly higher total compensation (Total Comp), which appears to be driven by significantly 
higher bonuses (Bonus) and option grants (Option). Bonuses and option grants are approximately 
50 percent higher for fraud firm CEOs. These differences are all significant at the 0.01 level for 
both means and medians. While fraud firm CEOs do have higher salaries (Salary) and restricted 
stock grants (Rstock), neither difference is statistically significant. The compensation differences 
are even more stark for non-CEOs9. Fraud firm non-CEOs also have higher bonuses and option 
grants at the 0.01 level for both means and medians but additionally have significantly higher mean 
salaries and restricted stock grants. Overall, this evidence suggests that fraud firms pay their 
executives higher levels of total compensation, which is mainly driven by large option grants.   
Bottom part of Table 2 - 2 presents mean and median values for firm level variables across 
fraud and non-fraud firms. Fraud firms are significantly different than non-fraud firms. Fraud firms 
                                                          
8 We collect this data for a number of firms in the Execucomp database to verify the accuracy and comparability of 
data from proxy filings with data from Execucomp. 
9 All compensation variables are expressed in thousands and are taken as the value would be presented in 
Execucomp. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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are larger, with higher market to book ratios and higher stock returns. They also have lower debt 
ratios and operate in fewer geographic segments. As these variables are also associated with 
executive compensation, they represent important controls for our cross-sectional tests. 
We also consider a time dimension to differences in compensation. Figures 2 - 1 and 2 - 2 
display cumulative total compensation over CEO (Figure 2 - 1) and non-CEO (Figure 2 - 2) tenure 
across fraud and non-fraud firms. Both figures indicate that differences in compensation are 
present from the early years of tenure and continue to increase over time. Differences in CEO pay 
are large, begin in the first year of CEO’s tenure, and grow at a close to constant rate through time. 
Differences in non-CEO pay are smaller during earlier tenure years, and the difference begins to 
grow at a much larger rate after the fifth year of tenure. 
[Insert Table 2 - 2, Figure 2 - 1, and Figure 2 - 2 here] 
4.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Compensation differences in fraud and non-fraud firms 
We test Hypothesis 1, whether fraud firms pay higher total compensation or higher components 
of compensation, by estimating the following equation: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 , , = 𝛽 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑀𝑇𝐵 , + 𝛽 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 , + 𝛽 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 , +
𝛽 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 , , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝑂 , , + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 ,          (1)         
Where Comp is either: Total Comp, Bonus, Salary, Rstock, or Option. Fraud is an indicator 
variable set to 1 if the executive works at a firm where fraud eventually occurs, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables are taken from prior executive compensation studies and defined in the 
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Appendix. Regressions estimated based on equation (1) include industry and year fixed effects, 
and standard errors are clustered by firm. 
The results are presented in Table 2 - 3. We find that executives in fraud firms are paid a 
significantly higher total compensation and that approximately two-thirds of this difference come 
from higher option grants (Total Comp and Option are both significant at the 0.01 level). Fraud 
firm executives are paid approximately $918,000 more per year and $592,000 more in option 
grants. Fraud firm executives also receive significantly higher bonuses (significant at the 0.05 
level) of approximately $230,000. While options and bonuses are both forms of incentive 
compensation, we find that the increase in options is approximately 2.5 times that of bonuses in 
fraud firms.  
Not surprisingly, we find that larger firms pay greater total compensation and also more of 
each compensation component (all significant at the 0.01 level). Firms with higher returns pay 
lower compensation (holds for all compensation component) while firms with more volatile stock 
prices pay higher compensation (holds for all compensation component). The results on stock price 
volatility could indicate that executives are paid a premium for working at risky firms, but option 
values also strictly increase in volatility, so the significantly larger difference in option values has 
more than one component. We find that the value of option grants and total compensation 
decreases over tenure while salary and bonus increase. Lastly, CEOs are paid more than non-
CEOs. 
[Insert Table 2 - 3 here] 
It is possible that something changes in fraud firms’ profiles in the years leading up to fraud 
that affects compensation. Perhaps the board of directors sets a new direction for the firm and 
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begins to prefer different pay packages, new executives enter the firm with different pay 
preferences, or current executives increase their bargaining power and negotiate pay changes for 
that reason. Prior research has not considered whether differences in equity incentives begin just 
before the fraud or are a long-standing aspect of the firm.  
To analyze the timeline of compensation differences in firms, we re-estimate equation (1) for 
each year of an executive’s tenure to consider trends in pay. Further, we distinguish between CEO 
and non-CEO executives as pay could vary temporally across the two groups, and we estimate 
equation (1) separately for each executive group. Results for CEOs are presented in Table 2 - 4. 
The results are largely consistent with those in Table 2 - 3, but they do not suggest that something 
happens over time within firms. Instead, they suggest that the firms systematically have different 
pay practices beginning in year 1 of a CEO’s tenure. CEOs at fraud firms have greater option 
grants in each of the first 10 years of their tenure, significantly so in the first 8 years.  Fraud firm 
CEOs also earn higher bonuses and salaries in the first 7 years of their tenure, but the combined 
amount of salary and bonus is less than the value of option grants in all of those years. Fraud firm 
CEOs earn a significantly higher restricted stock in years 2 through 5 of their tenure, but after that, 
restricted stock grants are insignificant and have a negative coefficient in some years. Bonus and 
salary differences are relatively constant over the first 6 and 8 years of CEO tenure while 
differences in option grants start at their highest point in year 1 of tenure and gradually decline 
(with a large upward spike in year 8). Option differences appear to drive over 50 percent of the 
difference in total compensation in 9 of 10 years of tenure. 
[Insert Table 2 - 4 here] 
The results for non-CEOs are presented in Table 2 - 5. Non-CEOs in fraud firms receive greater 
option grants in all the first 10 years of their tenures. They also receive higher bonuses during the 
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first 6 years of their tenure and higher salaries and restricted stock in 5 of the first 6 years of their 
tenures. The evidence suggests that fraud firms pay their non-CEOs greater total compensation 
across all components in the early years of their tenure and persist in awarding more valuable 
option grants throughout the first 10 years of tenure. The amount of the option grants is greater 
than the sum of bonuses, salary, and restricted stock in 9 of 10 years, and it is slightly lower in 
year 1. One key difference between CEOs and non-CEOs is that the value of option grants rises 
steadily over non-CEOs’ tenure, and then it begins to decline near the end of the first 10 years, 
instead of starting high and decreasing over time. A potential explanation is that fewer non-CEOs 
stay in their roles for 6 or more years, and it may require greater compensation to keep them from 
leaving and potentially taking a CEO position elsewhere.  
These results strongly suggest that executives at fraud firms receive greater compensation, 
largely through option grants, and that persists across an executive’s tenure at the firm. This holds 
regardless of when fraud occurs during an individual executive’s tenure and even when including 
executives who leave the firm years before the fraud begins. Thus, these differences do not seem 
to be affected by the years just before the fraud when the firm may be in decline. Still, the results 
do not tell us if there is variance in compensation preferences within the firm among executives 
who become involved in the fraud and those who do not. We examine compensation differences 
among executives in fraud firms next. 
[Insert Table 2 - 5 here] 
4.2 Compensation differences within fraud firms 
To examine Hypothesis 2 and test whether there are compensation differences within fraud 




𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 , =  𝛽 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 , + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 ,   (2) 
Where Comp is either: Total Comp, Bonus, Salary, Rstock, or Option. Named is an indicator 
variable set to 1 if the executive was named by the SEC as a perpetrator of the fraud, and 0 
otherwise. As this equation includes firm and year fixed effects and examines multiple executives 
in the same firm in the same year, we do not include the control variables modeled in equation (1).  
The results are presented in Table 2 - 6. Within fraud firms, we find that named executives do 
receive greater total compensation but that over 90% of this compensation is in the form of option 
grants, more specifically $933,000 total compensation and $918,000 in option grants. We also find 
that named executives have higher average salaries, but the difference is just $35,000. Similar to 
our cross-sectional results presented in Table 2 - 3, we find that bonuses and salaries increase with 
tenure. However, in contrast, we observe positive coefficients for total compensation, restricted 
stock, and options, though the latter two are not statistically significant. The results suggest that 
there is a variation within fraud firms in option grants among named and non-named executives.  
[Insert Table 2 - 6 here] 
We next consider whether there are patterns through executives’ tenure within fraud firms. The 
results are presented in Table 2 - 710. The results show a considerable variation through tenure 
years. Though significantly higher overall, named executives do not have significantly higher 
salaries in any one year of tenure, though the coefficient is positive in all 8 years. Named 
executives do not receive significantly higher or lower bonuses or restricted stock in any one year 
either and both have negative coefficients in 6 of 8 years. The association between perpetrating 
                                                          
10 We examine only the first 8 years of tenure as we have few observations and a little intra-firm variation to exploit 
after that point in time. 
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fraud and option grants appears driven mostly by the latter years of executive tenure. Named 
executives receive significantly higher option grants in years 5, 6, and 7 of their tenure at the 0.05 
level. It is important to mention that the coefficient in year 8 is economically large but statistically 
insignificant.  Option grants are also significantly higher in year 2 of tenure but are negative in 
years 1, 3, and 4, though economically small in years 3 and 4. Total compensation is only 
significantly higher in the years in which option grants are significantly higher.  
[Insert Table 2 - 7 here] 
The results in Table 2 - 6 and 2 - 7 suggest that named executives do have idiosyncratic 
compensation preferences, but the differences are generally only significant during the latter years 
of an executive’s tenure. Further, the differences are only present for option grants, which may be 
related to why some executives are more willing to take risks and misreport. It is also possible that 
many executives do not have the power to negotiate contracts tailored to their preferences until 
they have several years of tenure at the firm. Compensation differences within fraud firm are 
certainly less stable than they are between fraud and non-fraud firms, but the results do suggest 
the possibility of an executive effect. Next, we examine potential executive-related effect on the 
probability to misreport. 
4.3 Differences in diversification and portfolio management 
We estimate the following equation to examine Hypothesis 3 and test whether differences in 
how executives, within fraud firms, manage their equity portfolios are associated with 
misreporting risk.  
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𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 , , = 𝛽 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑 , , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑀𝑇𝐵 , + 𝛽 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 , +
𝛽 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 , + 𝛽 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 , , +
𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝑂 , , + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀 ,      (3)         
Where Portfolio is either: Shares Sold, Pct Shares Sold, Pct Options, Firm Wealth, or Ch Firm 
Wealth. Shares Sold is the number of shares the executive sold during the year. Pct Shares Sold is 
the percentage of total shares held the executive sold during the year. Pct Option is the percentage 
of equity shares held by the executive that is stock options. Firm Wealth is the percentage of the 
executive's total wealth held in firm equity. Total wealth is the sum of firm-based wealth following 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2013)  and non-firm based wealth following Dittmann and Maug 
(2007). Ch Firm Wealth is the change in Firm Wealth. Named is an indicator variable set to 1 if 
the executive is named by the SEC as a perpetrator of the fraud, and 0 otherwise. As there are no 
established models in the literature related to within firm portfolio management choices, we 
include the same control variables as those included in equation (1) discussed in section 4.1. These 
variables are defined in the Appendix. We also include firm and year fixed effects in the model to 
examine differences in the portfolio management among named and non-named executives in the 
same firm.  
Equation (3) is estimated for all executive tenure years after year 5. In the early years of tenure, 
executives are unlikely to have accumulated equity that they can contractually divest, and 
differences in equity holdings of executives hired internally versus externally could also more 
strongly explain portfolio choices in the first years of tenure. Most of the executives who are 
granted stock options as part of their compensation will not be able to exercise those options until 
3 or more years after they are granted. We choose to examine differences in portfolio management 
after the fifth year of tenure to be consistent with the prior literature. For instance, Malmendier 
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and Tate (2005) estimate executive overconfidence by examining differences in the executive 
portfolio management over years 6-10 of their tenure compared to years 1-511. 
The results are presented in Table 2 - 8 and provide strong evidence that executives who 
perpetrate fraud manage their firm-based equity in significantly different ways than do non-named 
executives within the same firm. First, named executives sell fewer shares of common stock each 
year and a smaller percentage of their stock holdings (both significant at the 0.05 level). The 
coefficient of - 0.103 on Named, when examining the percentage of shares sold, indicates that 
named executives sell 10 percent less of their common equity holdings per year than do non-named 
executives. Not surprisingly, we also find that executives sell fewer shares and a lower percentage 
of their holdings when stock prices are high as the coefficient on Return is negative and significant 
in both models. The results suggest that one reason why the perpetrators of fraud have strong 
equity incentives is because they hold a significantly larger percentage of previously accumulated 
equity.  
Second, named executives hold approximately 11 percent more of their total firm-level equity 
in the form of stock options (significant at the 0.01 level) compared to non-named executives in 
the same firm. As noted in Armstrong et al. (2013), stock options provide different risk taking 
incentives than do common shares. Most firms do not have contractual requirements regarding 
what percentage of equity must be held in options (that differ across executives in that firm), so 
this difference appears consistent with named executives having idiosyncratic preferences in how 
they manage their accumulated equity compensation. 
                                                          
11 Our results are highly similar in terms of both statistical and economic significance if we consider years after the 
fourth or sixth year of tenure, and they are available upon request. 
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Finally, we find that firm-based wealth is a higher percentage of total wealth for named 
executives (significant at the 0.01 level) than for non-named executives and that the year-on-year 
change in the fraction of total wealth that is firm-based is higher for named executives as well 
(significant at the 0.05 level). We find that 9 percent more of the named executive’s total wealth 
is associated with their firm’s equity. This lack of diversification creates relatively stronger 
incentives for misreporting that are independent of annual compensation differences. The fraction 
of wealth held in employer equities is increasing during tenure at a higher rate for named 
executives as well. For executives who stay with a firm for a long period of time, the differences 
in equity incentives due to portfolio management choices will become quite large. 
In sum, we find that named executives sell a lower percentage of their common stock holdings, 
hold a higher percentage of their firm-based equity in stock options, and have a larger percentage 
of their total wealth in their employer’s equities. These differences exist across executives in the 
same firm who operate in a similar contracting environment, suggesting that firm-level 
compensation preferences are not the cause of these differences. While idiosyncratic compensation 
preferences can be associated with the number of shares executives sell and the ratio of options to 
common shares, such preferences are unlikely to explain the percentage of stock an executive sells 
or the fraction of total wealth tied to employer equities. The evidence suggests that how executives 
manage their portfolios is strongly associated with the firm’s financial reporting risk. 
[Insert Table 2 - 8 here] 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
 The motivation of this study consists of prior empirical studies documenting a positive 
association between incentives from an executive’s firm-based wealth and financial misreporting. 
We consider three explanations for this documented positive association between equity-based 
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compensation and financial misreporting. The first is that future misreporting firms unilaterally 
choose or need to offer higher equity compensation to prospective hires. These misreporting firms 
may offer higher equity incentives due to specific strategies and preferences for risk or due to 
desire to attract talent. To test this explanation, we examine compensation differences between 
misreporting and control firms for all executives during their entire tenure with the respective firm. 
The second explanation, for the positive association between equity-based compensation and 
financial misreporting, is that executives, who perpetrate fraud, have different compensation 
preferences and negotiate pay packages with higher levels or ratios of equity compensation. Under 
this explanation, we examine compensation differences between executives who are named and 
executives who are not named as fraud perpetrators by the SEC. The third explanation is that 
regardless of across or within firm pay differences, executives who perpetrate reporting fraud have 
strong equity incentives because of how they manage their portfolio over time. If certain executives 
rarely divest themselves of equity-based compensation, then over time the value of their firm-
based wealth and any incentives it creates will grow regardless of firm or executive specific 
compensation differences. Therefore, we examine whether differences in how executives, within 
fraud firms, manage their equity portfolios are associated with the misreporting risk.  
In sum, we find at least some evidence for all three distinct explanations, that could lead to a 
positive association between equity incentives and misreporting. First, misreporting firms prefer 
to pay their executives differently; second, executives who perpetrate fraud negotiate contracts 
with a higher level of option grants; and third, executives who perpetrate fraud diversify 
themselves less and manage their portfolios differently from other executives. The results suggest 
that actions by both the firm and the executives contribute to an environment where misreporting 
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is more likely, and that pay practices by themselves may not significantly increase the fraud risk 
level if certain portfolio practices by executives are absent.  
These findings make important contribution to the accounting research literature by 
examining potential explanations for documented compensation differences between fraud and 
control firms. Unlike prior literature that examined compensation differences only in the last fraud 
year, we examine compensation differences over entire executive tenure, and also for each tenure 
year separately. Further, the results help practitioners by suggesting that both firm-level and 
executive-level compensation preferences combined with the idiosyncratic portfolio management 
all contribute jointly to an increased reporting risk. One possible channel through which the 
reporting risk could be reduced is to encourage executives to diversify their portfolios throughout 
their tenure as their firm-based wealth increases from accumulated compensation over time. 
These conclusions should be interpreted in light of various limitations. We assume the SEC 
accurately identifies perpetrators in fraud cases. The SEC exercises extreme diligence in naming 
executives in their enforcements, however, due to limited resources there exists the possibility that 
the SEC misses some of the perpetrators. Also, we only distinguish between CEO and non-CEO 
executives, which include among other CFOs, CAO, COO etc. The extent to which our findings 
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Fraud An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm is a fraud firm, and 0 otherwise SEC AAERs
Named An indicator variable set to 1 if the SEC named the executive as a perpetrator of 
fraud, and 0 otherwise
SEC AAERs
Total Comp Total value of all forms of compensation for the current year. Execucomp/SEC
Bonus Total value of cash bonuses received during the year. Execucomp/SEC
Salary Total value of base salary received during the year. Execucomp/SEC
Rstock Total value of restricted stock awarded during the year. Execucomp/SEC
Option Total value of stock options awarded during the year. Execucomp/SEC
Size The natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization. Compustat
MTB The ratio of the firm's market value of equity to book value. Compustat
Debt The ratio of the firm's long-term debt total assets. Compustat
Return The firm's market adjusted annual stock return. CRSP
Volatility The standard deviation of the firm's past 12 monthly stock returns. CRSP
Geographic The number of geographic segments the firm operates in. Compustat
Segment The number of business segments the firm operates in. Compustat
Tenure The tenure of the executive in the current role (for CEOs) or as a top 5 paid 
executive (non-CEOs).
Execucomp/SEC
CEO An indicator variable set to 1 if the executive is the firm's CEO, and 0 otherwise. Execucomp/SEC
Shares Sold The number of shares the executive sold during the year. Execucomp/SEC
Pct Shares Sold The percentage of total shares held the executive sold during the year. Execucomp/SEC
Pct Option The percentage of equity shares held by the executive that is stock options. Execucomp/SEC
Firm Wealth The percentage of the executive's total wealth held in firm equity; total wealth is 
the sum of firm based wealth following Coles et al. (2013) and non-firm based 
wealth following Dittman and Maug (2007).
Execucomp/SEC
Ch Firm Wealth The change Firm Wealth. Execucomp/SEC
Variable definitions and data sources
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AAERs (issued between 1/1/1986 - 12/12/2017) 3,815
AAER firms charged with financial statement manipulation with compensation data available prior to 
the manipulation period
392
Executives at AAER firms with compensation data prior to the manipulation period 2,903
Executives with compensation data named in an AAER as a perpetrator of fraud 627
This table provides summary statistics regarding the number of AAER fraud firms, executives at AAER firms, and
named executives at AAER firms with compensation data available.
40 
 











Mean Median Std. Deviation Mean Median Std. Deviation
Total Comp 4,644*** 2,543*** 5,257 3,605 2,013 4,123
Bonus 685*** 365*** 825 412 150 631
Salary 609 575 324 583 540 294
Rstock 282 0 783 245 0 675
Option 1,871*** 603*** 2,761 1,257 341 2,144
Tenure 8.44*** 7.00*** 6.58 7.78 6.00 6.31
Mean Median Std. Deviation Mean Median Std. Deviation
Total Comp 2,362*** 1,006*** 3,621 1,443 812 2,011
Bonus 363*** 155*** 593 178 74 327
Salary 331* 275 206 307 270 174
Rstock 194*** 0 614 97 0 353
Option 966*** 269*** 1,873 473 121 1,080
Tenure 3.22** 3.00* 2.37 3.83 3.00 2.93
Mean Median Std. Deviation Mean Median Std. Deviation
Size 7.89*** 7.71*** 1.92 7.21 7.14 1.64
MTB 3.21*** 2.27** 3.32 2.87 2.07 3.09
Debt 0.17** 0.13** 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.18
Return 0.20** 0.14** 0.57 0.15 0.09 0.54
Volatility 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.08
Geographic 2.42*** 2.00** 1.69 2.72 2.00 2.11
Segment 2.45 1.00 2.10 2.51 1.00 1.95




Fraud Firm Non-CEOs Non-Fraud Firm Non-CEOs
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of executive-level variables for fraud and non-fraud firms 
and for CEOs and non-CEOs. Variable are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
Fraud Firm CEOs Non-Fraud Firm CEOs
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Executive compensation in fraud and non-fraud firms
Total Comp Bonus Salary Rstock Option
Fraud 918.64*** 203.70** 10.93 91.39 592.21***
(2.76) (2.15) (0.96) (1.36) (2.66)
Size 923.03*** 107.35*** 62.85*** 103.50*** 432.83***
(25.67) (15.36) (34.00) (7.25) (18.08)
MTB -0.05 -0.02 -0.03* -0.05** 0.06
(-0.39) (-1.05) (-1.81) (-2.08) (0.88)
Debt 258.12 -18.60 65.01*** 120.41* -116.06
(1.54) (-0.67) (5.72) (1.95) (-0.89)
Return -472.71*** -39.14*** -22.15*** -34.09*** -299.53***
(-7.59) (-6.18) (-8.19) (-5.21) (-7.24)
Volatility 2,840.58*** 224.10*** 116.98*** 191.48*** 1,840.44***
(5.12) (4.57) (6.30) (4.66) (4.77)
Geographic 38.82** 0.42 2.44*** 15.35** 11.79
(2.43) (0.16) (2.64) (2.06) (1.16)
Segment 0.45 5.35 8.73*** -5.50 -21.73
(0.02) (1.41) (4.92) (-0.72) (-1.43)
Tenure -20.53*** 6.73*** 5.82*** -2.78 -26.10***
(-2.65) (3.19) (12.18) (-0.48) (-7.16)
CEO 2,673.82*** 304.57*** 259.05*** 278.08*** 1,258.97***
(33.08) (23.59) (64.19) (17.10) (21.02)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 168,674 194,489 194,489 144,705 168,788
Adjusted R-Squared 0.16 0.12 0.44 0.01 0.07
This table reports results from OLS regression estimates of equation (1) comparing components of executive 
compensation across fraud and non-fraud firms. Total Comp  is the total value of all forms of compensation for the 
current year; Bonus  is the value of cash bonuses received during the year; Salary  is the value of base salary 
received during the year; Rstock  is the value of restricted stock awarded during the year; Option  is the value of stock 
options awarded during the year. Fraud  is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm is a fraud firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables are are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
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CEO compensation by tenure year in fraud and non-fraud firms
Tenure Year Total Comp Bonus Salary Rstock Option Observations
1 7,240*** 558*** 179*** 93 6,191*** 3,860
(5.03) (5.38) (6.15) (0.38) (4.66)
2 3,927*** 639*** 162*** 420** 2,024*** 3,779
(6.73) (5.10) (4.97) (2.28) (5.15)
3 4,456*** 1056*** 143*** 601*** 2,302*** 3,419
(5.49) (10.58) (4.11) (3.46) (3.48)
4 4,227*** 765*** 126*** 414* 2,507** 3,061
(3.67) (7.18) (3.31) (1.70) (2.42)
5 2,574*** 399*** 100** 510*** 1,522** 2,742
(2.96) (3.22) (2.55) (2.74) (2.25)
6 2,215*** 698*** 101** -139 1,153** 2,417
(2.61) (5.25) (2.52) (-0.77) (2.23)
7 1,672** 281* 136*** 173 693* 2,090
(2.09) (1.90) (3.00) (0.93) (1.70)
8 3,376** 40 97** -323 2,797** 1,834
(2.40) (1.03) (2.00) (-1.25) (2.31)
9 161 38 28 19 387 1,592
(0.13) (0.21) (0.52) (0.11) (0.35)
10 78 -56 34 62 313 1,378
(0.09) (-0.37) (0.56) (0.27) (0.76)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports results from OLS regression estimates of equation (1) comparing components of executive 
compensation across fraud and non-fraud firms during each year of tenure for CEOs. Total Comp  is the total value of 
all forms of compensation for the current year; Bonus  is the value of cash bonuses received during the year; Salary 
is the value of base salary received during the year; Rstock  is the value of restricted stock awarded during the year; 
Option  is the value of stock options awarded during the year. Fraud  is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm is a 
fraud firm, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
















Tenure Year Total Comp Bonus Salary Rstock Option Observations
1 630*** 112*** 10** 136*** 242** 21,565
(4.53) (4.31) (2.34) (6.85) (2.53)
2 662*** 172*** 14*** 118*** 441*** 23,593
(9.52) (12.30) (3.05) (9.54) (8.53)
3 611*** 166*** 11** 69*** 363*** 25,346
(8.58) (9.14) (2.08) (3.75) (7.15)
4 702*** 171*** 9 76*** 464*** 17,942
(7.70) (10.00) (1.31) (3.57) (6.44)
5 1,236*** 329*** 23*** 224*** 587*** 12,637
(8.79) (12.64) (2.58) (7.40) (5.19)
6 1,609*** 206*** 21* -1 1,237*** 9,059
(8.06) (6.61) (1.86) (-0.04) (7.54)
7 1,281*** 22 1 -202 1,419*** 6,957
(3.09) (0.61) (0.05) (-0.50) (6.94)
8 1,269*** 91 0 299*** 940*** 5,242
(4.99) (1.62) (0.01) (3.36) (5.53)
9 1,343*** 74 -16 139 643** 3,766
(3.61) (0.86) (-0.70) (1.15) (2.29)
10 345 -33 -13 -229 754** 2,709
(0.66) (-0.37) (-0.41) (-1.55) (2.36)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports results from OLS regression estimates of equation (1) comparing components of executive 
compensation across fraud and non-fraud firms during each year of tenure for non-CEOs. Total Comp  is the total 
value of all forms of compensation for the current year; Bonus  is the value of cash bonuses received during the year; 
Salary  is the value of base salary received during the year; Rstock  is the value of restricted stock awarded during 
the year; Option  is the value of stock options awarded during the year. Fraud  is an indicator variable set to 1 if the 
firm is a fraud firm, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
(T-Statistic)
Coefficient on dichotomous variable Fraud
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Executive compensation within fraud firms
Total Comp Bonus Salary Rstock Option
Named 933** -19 35*** -62 918**
(2.17) (-0.20) (3.50) (-0.79) (2.46)
Tenure 124*** 52*** 17*** 8 35
(4.61) (9.36) (28.22) (1.59) (1.52)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,061 6,155 6,155 5,861 5,061
Adjusted R-Squared 0.28 0.25 0.54 0.17 0.21
This table reports results from OLS regression estimates of equation (2) comparing components of executive 
compensation within fraud firms across named and non-named executives. Total Comp  is the total value of all forms 
of compensation for the current year; Bonus  is the value of cash bonuses received during the year; Salary  is the 
value of base salary received during the year; Rstock  is the value of restricted stock awarded during the year; Option 
is the value of stock options awarded during the year. Fraud  is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm is a fraud firm, 
and 0 otherwise. T-statistics are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
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Tenure Year Total Comp Bonus Salary Rstock Option Observations
1 -1,031 -38 26 -103 -968 773
(-0.64) (-0.47) (1.47) (-0.65) (-0.65)
2 1,825** -18 31 -26 1,659** 903
(2.38) (-0.19) (1.57) (-0.25) (2.48)
3 -167 -44 24 -71 -96 967
(-0.16) (-0.31) (1.13) (-0.59) (-0.10)
4 -36 -8 28 -6 -39 637
(-0.03) (-0.05) (0.96) (-0.04) (-0.04)
5 1,083* -9 38 -43 1,221** 439
(1.81) (-0.04) (0.93) (-0.12) (2.05)
6 4,695* 384 22 200 4,248** 302
(1.93) (1.51) (0.39) (1.15) (2.03)
7 9,947** 181 2 -345 9,934** 196
(2.23) (0.75) (0.02) (-0.90) (2.29)
8 3,116 -39 120 338 2,183 128
(1.31) (-0.06) (1.18) (0.32) (1.42)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coefficient on dichotomous variable Named
(T-Statistic)
This table reports results from OLS regression estimates of equation (2) comparing components of executive 
compensation within fraud firms across named and non-named executives during each year of tenure. Total Comp  is 
the total value of all forms of compensation for the current year; Bonus  is the value of cash bonuses received during 
the year; Salary  is the value of base salary received during the year; Rstock  is the value of restricted stock awarded 
during the year; Option  is the value of stock options awarded during the year. Fraud  is an indicator variable set to 1 
if the firm is a fraud firm, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
46 
 












Sh Sold Sh Sold Pct Option Pct FBW Ch FBW
Named -338.086** -0.103** 0.111*** 0.091*** 0.125**
(-2.35) (-2.11) (3.30) (3.39) (2.41)
Size -48.704 0.023 0.012 0.039*** 0.076***
(-0.77) (1.14) (1.01) (3.40) (3.90)
MTB -17.203** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.004*
(-2.35) (-0.14) (-0.15) (0.63) (1.76)
Debt -518.310 -0.197 -0.046 0.091 0.224
(-1.27) (-1.59) (-0.55) (1.19) (1.61)
Return -207.503*** -0.032** -0.006 -0.006 -0.071***
(-4.07) (-2.15) (-0.58) (-0.66) (-4.65)
Volatility 819.054 0.400* 0.259** -0.205* 0.669***
(1.32) (1.92) (1.97) (-1.76) (3.48)
Geographic -50.222* -0.010 0.001 0.020*** 0.019*
(-1.84) (-1.15) (0.16) (3.62) (1.90)
Segment -0.541 -0.010 -0.005 -0.009** -0.005
(-0.02) (-1.28) (-1.13) (-2.04) (-0.55)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340 972
Adjusted R-Squared 0.12 0.21 0.58 0.45 0.29
This table reports results from OLS regression estimates of equation (3) comparing portfolio management differences 
within fraud firm across named and non-named executives after the fifth year of their tenure. Shares Sold  is the 
number of shares the executive sold during the year; Pct Shares Sold  is the percentage of total shares held by the 
executive sold during the year; Pct Option  is the percentage of executives total equity held in stock options; Firm 
Wealth  is the percentage of the executive's total wealth held in firm equity; total wealth is the sum of firm based 
wealth following Coles et al. (2013) and non-firm based wealth following Dittman and Maug (2007); Ch FimrWealth  is 
the change in Firm Wealth. Named  is an indicator variable set to 1 if the SEC named the executive as a perpetrator of 
fraud, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are clustered at the firm level. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
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Financial statements, filed with the SEC, are a joint collaboration of firm’s management 
and independent auditor12 (Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Mastrolia 2011). Management prepares the 
financial statements, whereas the auditor attests to the reliability of the reported financial 
information (DeFond, Francis and Hallman 2016). When financial reporting fraud (FRF) is 
detected, the alleged fraudulent firm and/or managers face private civil class-action from 
shareholders and federal sanctions from regulatory agencies (Karpoff et al. 2008a). In addition to 
the fraudulent firms and managers, shareholders and regulatory agencies, i.e. the SEC and the 
Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB), may pursue charges against the auditor. For instance, 
PCAOB oversees auditors’ violations of Generally Accepted  Auditing Standards (GAAS), 
PCAOB auditing standards and rules, and SEC Rules (Carcello et al. 2011). Thus, enforcements 
are not only issued against the fraudulent firms and/or managers, but also against auditors. 
Prior literature has examined extensively the auditor’s litigation risk (Kaplan and Williams 
2013; Reffett 2010; Cornell et al. 2009; Kadous and Mercer 2012; Bonner et al. 1998b), however, 
little is known about the SEC enforcements against the auditor (DeFond et al. 2016). Primarily, 
SEC investigates federal securities laws violations and issues accounting and auditing 
enforcements releases (AAERs) (25 SEC Docket 2 1982) or litigation releases (LRs), against firms 
with materially misstated financial statements. The SEC has also found various violations by the 
auditors, such as violating the auditor independence rule (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2015), or deficient audits, which is failure to gather sufficient competent audit 
evidence and to exercise due professional care (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal 2013). 
                                                          
12 In the rest of this study, “auditor” refers to independent/external auditors as distinguished from internal auditors. Also, this 
study does not distinguish between independent audit firms and auditors/partners working for them.  
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The SEC finds auditing related violations in 17 percent (Eutsler, Nickell and Robb 2016)  
to 39 percent (Bonner, Palmrose and Young 1998) of the total investigated fraud cases. In these 
cases, the SEC finds the auditor responsible for failing to identify the FRF in due time and charges 
the auditor with auditing violations. Examining the AAERs/LRs, the evidence shows that in the 
remaining 61 - 83 percent of the fraud cases, the SEC discloses two different findings regarding 
the auditor. In some cases, the SEC finds that the fraud scheme was concealed from the auditor or 
that the auditor was misled during the audit, and when there is no such finding in the remaining 
cases, the SEC is silent on the role of the auditor in auditing the fraudulent financial statements. In 
sum, the SEC has three different auditor related findings: the auditor is charged, the fraud scheme 
is concealed from the auditor, and there is no particular finding regarding the auditor, i.e. the SEC 
is silent.  
Peecher et al. (2013) argue, theoretically, that the auditors’ accountability framework 
depends on audit outcomes rather than the attributes of auditors’ judgment process. According to 
this framework, the three SEC findings, charged, silent or concealed, are determined based on 
auditor’s opinion on the audited financial statements and subsequent detection of the FRF. The 
overall auditing procedures followed during the auditing process are not taken into consideration. 
Thus, charged, silent and concealed findings are affected by the type and the extent of the 
misreporting in the financial statements. Further, the authors argue that the auditors’ accountability 
framework should be a process-reward framework, where the auditors are rewarded for the 
auditing process regardless of subsequent FRF detection.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the association of the three SEC’s auditor related 
findings and the fraud characteristics, i.e. fraud duration, fraud amount, collusion, type of fraud 
and perpetrator’s position in the fraudulent firm. The sample of fraudulent firms is identified 
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through the AAERs/LRs issued by the SEC, where the company and/or manager was charged with 
Rule 10(b)-5 violation. In other words, Rule 10(b) charges companies and/or managers with the 
intent to misreport, thus the intent to commit fraud.  
The results indicate a weak association between the fraud characteristics and the SEC’s 
findings against the auditors. Collusion among perpetrators and asset misreporting fraud schemes 
increase the probability of the SEC charging the auditor as compared to the probability of being 
silent. Whereas the perpetrator’s executive position decreases the probability of the SEC charging 
the auditor as compared to the probability of being silent. Also, in asset misreporting fraud cases, 
the SEC is more likely to charge the auditor as compared to finding that the fraud scheme is 
concealed from the auditor. Overall, only a few fraud characteristics are associated with the SEC’s 
auditor related findings, which is not consistent with an outcome-penalty accountability 
framework. In contrast, the results indicate that the auditor type, whether the auditor is a Big N 
auditor or not, is significantly associated with the SEC’s findings. More specifically, when the 
fraudulent financial statements are audited by a Big N auditor, the SEC is more likely to remain 
silent or to find that the fraud scheme is concealed from the auditor as compared to charging the 
auditor. Prior literature argues that Big N auditors provide better quality audits (DeAngelo 1981, 
Francis 2004). This evidence is more consistent with a process-reward accountability framework 
than an outcome-penalty accountability framework.   
This study makes two important contributions. First, the findings of this study provide 
empirical insight into the discussion of whether the current regulatory system relies on audit 
outcomes or on attributes of auditors’ judgment processes. The SEC’s purpose in issuing 
enforcements against the auditor is to improve audit quality by holding auditors accountable. 
DeFond et al. (2011) find that the presence of the SEC regional offices or recent enforcements 
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issued by the SEC significantly influence the audit quality of the independent auditor. Further, 
Carcello et al. (2011) find that the PCAOB inspection process has led to improved audit quality. 
The accountability framework, employed by the regulatory bodies in disciplining auditors, impacts 
audit quality. Thus, examining auditor accountability framework contributes to the current 
discussion on audit quality provided by the independent auditors.  
Second, the findings provide insights to auditors in managing risks in subsequently 
detected FRF. When auditors fail to supply high audit quality, they face serious consequences, 
such as sanctions from the SEC (Beasley et al. 2013), litigation risk (Bonner et al. 1998b), 
reputation risk (Weber, Willennborg and Zhang 2008)  and enhanced inspection from the PCAOB. 
Therefore, auditors are constantly trying to manage engagement risks (Johnstone and Bedard 2003, 
2004) and to maximize audit quality in order to avoid facing any of the above consequences. One 
approach to manage perceived risk is resignation from high-risk clients (Bockus and Gigler 1998; 
Shu 2000). However, auditors are not always successful in avoiding risky clients. Issuance of an 
AAER/LR suggests that the auditor failed to identify a risky client in due time. Consequently, it is 
important that auditors take additional steps, during audit procedures, to reduce the risks associated 
with high-risk clients that were not identified during the client acceptance process. Thus, in an 
attempt to minimize engagement risk, it is essential for auditors to understand what aspects of audit 
process would decrease their likelihood to be named as a defendant by the SEC.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the 
accountability framework and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample and the 
empirical model used in this study. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes this 
study.    
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2.0 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 SEC Enforcements and Findings 
 Publicly held companies are required, under Federal securities laws, to have their financial 
statements audited by an independent auditor prior to their filing with the SEC. The financial 
statements remain the responsibility of the company’s management, however, the auditor provides 
reasonable assurance that they are free of material misstatement, and fairly represent the financial 
position of the company (AU Section 508: Reports on Audited Financial Statements). Auditors are 
the gatekeepers, who verify or assess corporate disclosures, to protect investors (Coffee 2004).  
The SEC has continuously emphasized the fundamental role that the gatekeepers, i.e. 
auditors, play in achieving its mission to protect investors and the capital market. Former Chair of 
the SEC, Mary Jo White, considered auditors the key gatekeepers who ensure shareholders of high-
quality financial reports (White 2015). On a similar note, Andrew Ceresney, former Director of 
Division of Enforcement of the SEC, considered independent auditors to be critical gatekeepers 
who attest that issuers are making timely, comprehensive, and accurate disclosure (Ceresney 
2016a). Given the SEC’s focus on financial reporting (White 2013), auditors’ work warranted 
tighter supervisor. Therefore, ‘Operation Broken Gate’ and Financial Reporting and Audit Task 
Force (referred to as FRAud13 Task Force) were introduced in 2013 as part of the Division of 
Enforcement. ‘Operation broken gate’ seeks ‘to identify auditors who fail to carry out their duties 
and responsibilities consistent with professional standards’ (SEC 2013-207). FRAud Task Force’s 
mission is to detect and prevent financial reporting and accounting fraud (Ceresney 2013).  
The SEC’s tighter supervision resulted in a substantial increase, as compared to prior years, 
in enforcements issued for undetected FRF. In 2016, the SEC filed 868 enforcement actions, the 
                                                          
13 “FRAud” is the acronym of Financial Reporting and Audit. 
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most in the SEC’s history (Agency Financial Report 2016), and a substantial increase from 807 
and 755 enforcements in 2015 and 2014, respectively (Agency Financial Report 2015, 2014). 
These initiatives also resulted in a substantial increase in the number of auditor proceedings under 
Rule 102(e), which regulates auditor accountability and independence, from 37 respondents in 
2013 to 76 in 2015 (Ceresney 2016b). Also in 2015, the SEC charged two national audit firms, 
BDO and Grant Thornton, which were the first audit failure enforcements against a national audit 
firm since 2009 (Ceresney 2016b). The following example illustrate a case when the SEC charges 
the auditor for missing the FRF.  
 “The complaint alleges that KPMG and its partners permitted Xerox to manipulate its 
accounting practices to close a $3 billion "gap" between actual operating results and results 
reported to the investing public.”14  
 
Yet evidence shows that the SEC charges the auditor, in total, in as low as 17 percent of 
undetected fraud cases (Eutsler et al. 2016; Kedia et al. 2017). This finding is, also, in contrast 
with the Coffee (2004)’s argument that failure in independent auditing was the key factor of 2001-
2002 fraud cases. In cases when the auditor is not charged, the SEC either finds that the FRF was 
concealed from the auditor or is silent on the auditor’s role when there is no such finding. Thus, in 
certain cases, the SEC finds that the fraud scheme is concealed from auditor or that the auditor is 
misled during the audit. In other cases, the SEC does not have such particular finding regarding 
the role of the auditor in the detected FRF and remains silent. The following examples illustrate 
the finding when the SEC finds that the FRF is concealed from the auditor or the auditor is misled. 
“…Olesnyckyj misled Monster's outside auditors in an attempt to hide the backdating 
scheme by providing documentation to them that misrepresented the grant date of the 
stock option awards.” LR 20004; AAER 2558 – February 15, 2007. 
                                                          
14 LR 17954; AAER 1709 – January 29, 2003 
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  “The complaint also alleges that Smith, Laskey, and Brooks took steps to prevent 
Quest's independent auditors from discovering the backdating, including the use of false 
written consents by Quest's board of directors.”  LR 20950; AAER 2949 – March 12, 2009.  
A priori all material misstatements, subsequently detected, are concealed from the auditors. In 
other words, the FRFs investigated by the SEC indicate that the auditor failed to detect them during 
the auditing procedures. If issuance of an AAER/LR is a measure of low audit quality (DeFond 
and Zhang 2014) because the auditor failed to detect a material misstatement, it is important to 
examine those cases when the SEC did not find the audit deficient.  
2.2 SEC Enforcements and Accountability Framework 
There is a relatively sparse academic literature that examines the SEC’s enforcements 
against the auditors (Kedia et al. 2017). Three studies, Kedia, Khan and Rajgopal (2017), Eutsler, 
Nickell and Robb (2016), and Rollings and Bremser (1997) examine the SEC’s decision to charge 
the auditor as a defendant when FRF is subsequently detected. Table 3 - 1 provides a summary of 
these three studies. There are two literature gaps that these three studies have yet to address. The 
first gap relates to the SEC’s auditor related findings. All three studies examined a binary finding 
of the SEC, whether to charge the auditor as the defendant or not to charge the auditor. Analysis 
of the AAERs/LRs indicates that there are three, not to two, possible auditor related findings 
following the investigation of an alleged fraud by the SEC.  Distinguishing among the three 
SEC’s findings, described in detail in section 2.1 (i.e. charged, silent and concealed), is important 
to auditors. Auditors are constantly trying to minimize litigation risks, and a concealment finding 
from the SEC, may lower their litigation risks.  
Given the variability of findings that the auditors face from the SEC, it is important to 
examine the accountability framework that the SEC employs. In a theoretical study, Peecher et al. 
(2013) observed that auditors’ accountability framework is predominantly based on outcome 
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judgment and penalties. The auditors’ performance is judged based on their conclusion together 
with subsequent adverse financial statement outcomes, and it is often manifested in the form of 
penalties. This type of framework motivates auditors to have a short-term compliance-based 
behavior slightly above the noncompliance threshold in order to avoid penalties. The authors 
further argue that an accountability system, based on the audit process judgment and reward, 
motivates auditors and increases audit quality by rewarding auditors for well-justified judgment 
processes, performance exceeding minimum compliance threshold, and improvement in fraud 
detection procedures. 
This study examines whether the current enforcement system employed by the SEC, in 
overseeing auditors, is an outcome-penalty based framework or process-reward based framework. 
In an outcome-penalty based framework, the SEC’s findings, charged, silent or concealed, are 
determined based on the auditing outcome. The penalties that SEC enforces against the auditor are 
affected by the FRF that the auditor failed to detect. In a process-reward system, the penalties, or 
the lack of, that the SEC enforces against the auditor are not affected by the FRF that was not 
detected. Under such accountability framework, the SEC’s findings, charged, silent and concealed, 
are determined by examining the auditing process carried out by the auditor, and disregarding the 
auditing outcome, i.e. missed FRF.  
[Insert Table 3-1 here 
The second gap relates to examining the fraud characteristics and their impact in the three 
SEC’s findings on the auditor. Prior literature has examined various key factors that increases or 
decreases the probability that the auditor is charged or not charged by the SEC. However, variables 
that relates to fraud characteristics are rarely examined in the literature. Kedia et al. (2017) and 
Eutsler et al. (2016) control only for the violation tenure and the type of the violation. Whereas 
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Rollins and Bremser (1997) consider only the type of violation. Also, prior studies on auditors’ 
overall litigation risks have examined only a few variables that capture characteristics of the FRF 
act. For instance, Bonner et al. (1998a) examined whether certain fraud types result in a higher 
likelihood of litigation against independent auditors, while controlling for fraud tenure. In a 
footnote, the authors state that they attempted to measure several other control variables, such as 
whether management lied to the auditor, whether collusion was involved, the specific office of the 
auditing firm primarily responsible for the client, and the importance of the client to the auditor, 
however, sufficient information was not disclosed. Since 1998, over 20 years of additional data 
are available to supplement the design used by Bonner et al. (1998b). This study addresses these 
two literature gaps by examining the association of the SEC’s findings (i.e. charged, silent and 
concealed) with the fraud scheme characteristics. Further, given prior literature findings that 
auditor accountability framework relies on audit outcome rather than on audit process (Peecher et 
al. (2013); Eutsler et al. (2016); Reffett (2010)), this study examines empirically, the auditor’s 
accountability framework. More specifically, this study examines whether auditing outcomes, 
operationalized as undetected fraud characteristics, significantly impact the SEC’s decision to 
charge the auditor, to find that the fraud was concealed from the auditor, or to be silent. Hypothesis 
one follows:   





 The SEC’s enforcement activities are carried out by the Division of Enforcement, 
founded in 1972, and are reported in the issuance of an AAER or a LR (25 SEC Docket 2 1982)15. 
Given the limited amount of resources, the SEC investigates only misreporting cases which are 
expected to have an significant economic impact (Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2011). The SEC 
receives the indications of violating firms from various sources (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
1996), such as (i) reviews of Securities Act filings (1933, 1934), (ii) market surveillance of 
programs of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities 
Dealers and (iii) public complaints, tips, referrals from other law enforcement agencies, and the 
financial press. As of April 2019, the SEC has issued 4031 AAERs. An AAER does not have a 
standardized format and the information disclosed in each AAER vary by case. However, most 
AAERs follow similar structure as presented in Figure 3 - 1. The head of an AAER includes the 
date it was issued, the title and the identification number of the document. The first paragraph, 
after the title, provides information about the judicial district in which the case was prosecuted, 
the defendant and the final decision issued.  The second paragraph describes the alleged 
misreporting scheme by naming the organization involved, the type of misreporting committed, 
duration of the misreporting, estimation of the misreported amount, the individuals, organizations 
                                                          
15 From its beginning in 1937, the SEC had been issuing Accounting Series Releases (ASRs), primarily issued to inform 
interested parties on accounting and auditing matters. On April 15, 1982, SEC announced that the previously issued 
ASRs would be substituted with two types of releases, namely Financial Reporting Releases (FRRs) and Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). FRRs are used to disclose updates of the codifications of financial 
reporting policies, whereas AAERs are used to announce accounting and auditing matters related to the SEC’s 




or independent auditor involved in the misreporting scheme and other information deemed relevant 
by the SEC.  
   [Insert Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 here] 
 The amount of details disclosed about the misreporting scheme varies substantially in 
each AAER, and there is no official explanation provided on how the information disclosure is 
determined. The last paragraph enumerates the rules that the defendants violated and the penalties 
that are enforced against them. The final sentence in an AAER lists other AAERS or enforcement 
documents that have been prior issued on the same investigated case. A LR follows a very similar 
structure as an AAER. An illustration of a LR is presented in Figure 3 - 2. 
This study uses two independent datasets to identify the fraud firms named in the AAERs 
and/or LRs, and the characteristics of the respective misreporting schemes. The first database is 
developed by Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011) (herein after Dechow dataset) and is available 
for purchase through Haas School of Business at University of California Berkeley16. The second 
dataset, named AAER/LR database, is developed by The Institute for Fraud Prevention’s (IFP)17 
(here in after IFP dataset) and is available through a data grant process. 
To develop the Dechow dataset, Dechow et al. (2011) examined the AAERs issued by the 
SEC since 1987 and identified 2,190 AAERs with 67618 unique firms. The initial database has 
been continuously updated. The latest version of database was purchased on April 19, 2017. The 
document that accompanies the purchase of the database states that it consists of 3,813 AAERs 
(1,540 firm misstatement events) issued between May 17th, 1982 and September 30th, 2016. The 
                                                          
16 http://accounting.haas.berkeley.edu/cfrm/aaer-dataset.html 
17 http://www.theifp.org/about.html 




initial number of 3,813 AAERs is reduced to 3,556 after leaving out missing AAERs and AAERs 
that do not mention a specific company name. Also, the database contains 1,019 firm misstatement 
events that affect at least one of the firms’ quarterly or annual financial statements.  
The IFP database includes 882 fraud cases identified through the AAERs and the LRs 
issued by the SEC as of 2015. Part of these fraud cases were identified by the first and the second 
COSO reports. The first COSO report identified 294 fraud cases for 1987-1997 period (Beasley, 
Carcello and Hermanson 1999) and the second COSO report identified 347 cases (Beasley et al. 
2010). Out of the total 882 fraud cases, 177 cases were not coded either for missing AAERs/LRs 
or missing GVKEY for the firm involved in the misreporting.  
The Dechow dataset identifies the misreporting firms through the AAERs, whereas the IFP 
datasets uses both AAERs and LRs to identify the misreporting firms. There is an 80 percent 
overlap of the identified misreporting cases between the two datasets. Both datasets include only 
the enforcements where the company and/or officers are charged with Rule 10(b)-5 violation. This 
rule constitutes the primary antifraud statute included in Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and 
Exchange Act (Carcello and Nagy 2004). In other words, Rule 10(b) charges companies and/or 
managers with the intent to misreport, thus the intent to commit fraud. The sample for this study 
consists of publicly traded firms that misstated their financial statements. These fraudulent firms 
are identified though the AAERs/LRs issued by the SEC, and where Rule 10(b)-5 is listed as a 
violation.  
The final sample of misreporting firms in this study is obtained by merging Dechow dataset 
and the IFP dataset initially by the CIK number, then by firm name, and lastly by AAER number. 




3.2. Empirical Model  
3.2.1. Dependent variable: SEC’s Findings 
The SEC makes three different auditor related findings in the AAERs/LRs issued.  In some cases, 
the SEC charges the auditors for negligent audit or violation of anti-fraud statutes (Beasley et al. 
2013). In other cases, the SEC finds that the fraud act was concealed from the auditor.  In the rest 
of the cases, the SEC is silent, i.e. neither charges nor proclaims that the fraud scheme was 
concealed. The dependent variable in this study is the SEC’s auditor related finding when the firm 
and/or executives are charged with Rule 10(b)-5 violation. The IFP dataset has an indicator 
variable ‘Concealed from Auditor’, which equals 1 if the SEC specifically stated that the fraud 
scheme was concealed from auditor and 0 otherwise. The fraud cases where ‘concealed from 
auditor’ equals 0 are filtered out, and then the AAERs, identified in Dechow dataset, are used to 
determine whether the SEC charges the auditors or whether the SEC is silent. Thus, the depend 
variable in this study takes three values: charged, silent or concealed.  
  3.2.2. Independent Variable: Fraud Characteristics   
Prior studies examining the auditors’ litigation risk have controlled for different fraud 
characteristics and found mixed results. Eutsler et al. (2016) found that including a going concern 
issue (GC) in the audit opinion letter increases the probability of an AAER being issued against 
the auditor. In their model, the authors controlled for fraud tenure, fraud type measured as revenue 
or disclosure fraud and number of misstated accounts. Only the number of misstated accounts 
statistically significantly increased the probability of an enforcement being issued by SEC against 
the auditor. Kaplan and Williams (2013) find the opposite results. The authors report a negative 
association between GC reporting and auditor litigation, arguing that auditors deter lawsuits by 
issuing a GC reports to financially stressed clients. Further, Bonner et al. (1998b) analyzed the 
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AAERs issued by the SEC and found that auditors have a higher probability of being sued for 
commonly occurring fraud and frauds arisen from fictitious transactions. The authors included the 
number of years with misstated financial information to control for fraud duration. Lastly, Rollins 
and Bremser (1997) examined three type of fraud violation as a determinant of the probability of 
the SEC enforcement against the auditor. The three violations included falsification of accounting 
records by the management, asset and/or revenue overstatement and inadequate disclosure in the 
financial statement. The results found that only the inadequate disclosure increased the probability 
of an SEC enforcement action against the auditor.  
In sum, prior studies have controlled for some aspects of fraud characteristics in auditor 
litigation risk, yet the key fraud characteristics, regarding fraud amount, fraud scheme and 
perpetrators, are excluded from their models. This study examines the impact of key fraud 
characteristics on the probability of the SEC’s auditor related findings. The key fraud 
characteristics included in the model are: fraud duration, type of fraud, which include revenue 
fraud, asset misreporting fraud and disclosure fraud, fraud amount, number of perpetrator and 
perpetrator executive position within the fraud firm.  
Fraud duration (FR_DURATION) is expected to positively increase the probability of the 
SEC enforcements against the auditor. Prior literature has found a positive but non-significant 
result when fraud duration is measured in years (Bonner et al. 1998b; Eutsler et al. 2016), however 
when fraud duration is measured in months, the results are positive and significant (Kedia et al. 
2017). In several cases, fraud schemes last only a couple of months and affect only limited number 
of quarterly or annual financial statements. Therefore, FR_DURATION is measured in this study 
in the number of quarterly financial statements affected by the misstatement. This variable is 
available in Dechow dataset.  
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Every fraud scheme investigated by the SEC is unique, however the following three fraud 
schemes are expected to have a significant impact. Revenue Fraud (REVFraud) is measured as a 
binary variable where 1 indicate whether fraudulent firm misreported its revenue account and 0 
otherwise. Prior literature cites meeting and beating earnings prediction as one of the common 
pressures to commit fraud. Hence, the income statement accounts are the most commonly 
manipulated to achieve that goal. Fraudulent schemes often affect balance sheet accounts, as well. 
The next type of fraud examined in this study is asset misreporting fraud (AMFraud), which equals 
1 if assets are misreported and 0 otherwise. Finally, failing to disclose material information 
(DISCFraud) is examined in prior literature as having a significant effect on litigation risk (Eutsler 
et al. 2016; Rollins and Bremser 1997). This variable is also measured as binary variable, where it 
equals 1 if the fraudulent firm failed to disclose information in the financial statements and 0 
otherwise. 
Prior literature (Bonner et al. 1998b; Dechow et al. 2011; Kaplan and Williams 2013) and 
current studies (Eutsler et al. 2016; DeFond et al. 2016; Kedia et al. 2017) have not controlled for 
or examined the effect of the misreported amount, number and position of the fraud perpetrator. 
The primary reason  appears to be the lack available data. Bonner et al. (1998b) stated in a footnote 
that they attempted to collect additional information on whether management lied to the auditor or 
whether collusion was involved, however there was not sufficient information. Since 1998, there 
are about 20 years of additional data available and the IFP dataset possesses the information on 
the misreported amount (FR_AMOUNT), measured in in U.S. dollars. Auditors are found more 
responsible for missing high-profile fraud schemes that involve high-rank executives such as CEO, 
CFO or COO, than low profile fraud schemes such as lower level employee. Therefore, the position 
of the perpetrator named in the AAERs/LRs (PERP_POSITION), available in the IFP dataset, is 
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an indicator variable where it is equal to 1 if the perpetrator is the CEO, COO or the president of 
the fraudulent firm and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the IFP dataset has three indicator variables on the 
different position held by the fraud perpetrators. The sum of these three indicator variables 
(COLLUSION) indicate whether two or more perpetrators colluded to carry out the fraud scheme.  
3.2.3. Control Variables: Firm characteristics and auditor characteristics 
Prior literature controls for two primary groups of control variables, firm characteristics 
and auditor characteristics. Firm size (FIRM_SIZE) is argued in the literature to be a key 
determinant of the litigation against the auditor (Eutsler et al. 2016). Furthermore, firm size affects 
the auditor’s choice, i.e. bigger firms tend to choose Big Four auditors (PWC, KPMG, EY and 
Deloitte). Prior literature argues that bigger auditors are less vulnerable to litigations due to 
increase availability of resources (Bonner et al. 1998b). Firm size is measured as the ratio of total 
revenues over the total assets on the year prior to the first misreported year or year prior to that in 
cases where data was missing. Financial distress is a common red flag for fraud, therefore 
bankruptcy filing from the firms increase the likelihood of litigation against the auditors (Kaplan 
and Williams 2013). Issuance of a going concern issue (GC) by the independent auditors increases 
the likelihood of litigation against the auditor, since a going concern is an indicator of distress 
(DeFond et al. 2016; Kaplan and Williams 2013), hence the auditors should have been aware of 
higher fraud risk. GC is measured as a binary variable and equals 1 if the auditor issued a going 
concern in their report.  
Certain characteristics related to the auditor are found by prior literature to either increase 
or decrease as the likelihood of enforcement from the SEC. Kedia et al. (2017) found that the SEC 
is significantly less likely to name a Big N auditor as a defendant. In addition to that, being 
classified as a Big N auditor (being it Big 4 or  Big 5 or Big 6) increases the auditors’ prestige 
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(Rollins and Bremser 1997) which is associated with higher audit quality and less enforcement 
risk. Therefore, a binary variable (BIG-N) is included to indicate whether the auditor is one of the 
five audit firms: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, Deloitte & 
Touche LLP, and Arthur Andersen LLP, and 0 otherwise. Auditor’s tenure (AUDIT_TENURE) 
with the client firms is found to be negatively associated with fraudulent reporting (Carcello and 
Nagy 2004). Therefore, a variable is included to measures the number of consecutive years an 
auditor audited the same client until the last year of the fraud duration. 
 In 2002 after the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, there was a change in the 
regulation of auditing profession. Prior to 2002, public auditors were supervised through a peer 
review system regulated by the American Institute of Certified Public Auditors (AICPA). Then, in 
the wake of large FRF scandals, SOX Act was passed, and the Public Company Auditing Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) was established to provide oversight of the auditing profession. Given the change 
in auditing oversight, a dummy year variable is included to control for before and after SOX fraud 
cases. Based on prior literature, the following empirical model is proposed.  
SEC_Finding = β0 + β1*FR_DURATION + β5*FR_AMOUNT + β6*COLLUSION + 
β2*REVFraud + β3*AMFraud + β4*DISCFraud + β7*PERP_POSITION + 
β8*FIRM_SIZE + β9*AUDIT_TENURE + β10*GC + β11*BIG-N + 
β13*SOX + ε 
4.0. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample in this study consist of 196 fraudulent firms. Table 3 - 2 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the sample. The first column reports full sample descriptive statistics and 
the next three columns report the descriptive statics by the SEC’s finding. On average, 11.7 
quarterly financial statements are misreported, and the fraud scheme was perpetrated by 1.6 
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individuals. Majority of the perpetrators, 64.8 percent (127 perpetrators) hold top executive 
positions, i.e. CEO, COO or president, and the rest, 35.2 percent (69 perpetrators) hold lower level 
positions. The three types of fraud examined in this study are not mutually exclusive as perpetrated 
fraud schemes are complex and affect more than one type of financial statements. Therefore, the 
total fraud cases involving revenue, asset misreporting and disclosure fraud exceeds 100%. There 
are 122 (62.2 percent) fraud cases where the revenue is misreported, 49 (25 percent) where assets 
are misreported, and 74 (37.8 percent) where the fraud firm failed to disclose significant 
information in the financial statements. On average, the auditors have audited the financial 
statements for 3 years and issued a going concern in the audit report in 15.8 percent (31 cases) of 
the time. Most of the auditors, 78.6 percent (154 cases) are BIG-N auditors. Lastly, over half of 
the fraud cases, 54.1 percent (106 cases) terminated before the passage of the SOX act and 45.9 
percent (90 cases) terminated after the passage of SOX act.  
In most of the fraud cases in the sample, 122 cases (62.2 percent), the SEC finds that the 
fraud scheme was concealed from the auditor. In 45 cases (23 percent), the SEC remains silent and 
does not have any particular finding regarding the auditor, and in the remaining of the 29 cases 
(14.8 percent), the SEC charges the auditor for auditing related violations.  Recent studies report 
similar charging rate of auditors in the AAERs/LRs. Eutsler et al. (2016) and Kedia et al. (2017) 
find that auditors are charged in 17% of the cases. Earlier studies report a higher percentage of 
auditors being charged in the AAERS. Rollins and Bremser (1997) found that in 1/3 of the cases 
the SEC issued AAERs against the auditors, for the AAERs issued from 1982 through August 
1991.  Dechow et al. (1996) found 165 out of 436 AAERs (37%), between April 1982 and 
December 1992, to be issued against auditors for violations of auditing standards. Bonner et al. 
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(1998b) found that 39% of the 261 firms subject to SEC Enforcement actions between 1982-1995, 
have enforcements issued against auditors as well. 
In comparing the sample by the SEC’s finding, fraud cases where the SEC is silent differs 
from the other two cases. On average, they last longer, 13.6 quarterly financial statements are 
misreported as compared to charged cases, where 11.7 and concealed cases, 11.1 quarterly 
financial statements are misreported. Silent cases also involve fewer perpetrators, 1.1, on average, 
than the other two cases, and they also have the lowest percentage, 53.3 percent of top executives 
who have a high ranked position, as compared to 72.4 percent in charged group and 76.2 percent 
in the concealed group. In comparing the auditor characteristics, the fraud cases where the auditor 
is charged have the shortest audit tenure (2.8 years), the lowest percentage of the Big-N auditors 
(55.2 percent) and the highest percentage of fraud schemes terminated before the passing of SOX 
act, as compared to the other two groups.  
Table 3 - 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the independent variables.  
The results indicate a statistically significant and positive Pearson correlation among the fraud 
characteristic indicators. Fraud duration has a positive and significant correlation with fraud 
amount (+ 0.38, two tailed p < 0.01) and significant negative correlation with revenue fraud (-0.24, 
two tailed p < 0.01). It is interesting to notice that collusion has a positive and significant 
correlation with perpetrator position (+ 0.75, two tailed p < 0.01). Fraud cases where top executives 
are involved in the fraud schemes have more perpetrators in total than fraud cases where top 
executives are not involved.19  Regarding auditor characteristics, audit tenure has positive and 
significant correlation with the fraud duration (+ 0.40, two tailed p < 0.01) and fraud amount (+ 
                                                          
19 This result needs to be interpreted with caution as the IFP dataset did not indicate the total number of perpetrators 
involved, rather it indicated whether the perpetrators are top executive, lower level executives or part of the board of 
directors. The total sum of these three indicator variables yielded the number of the perpetrators in this study. 
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0.19, two tailed p < 0.01). Lastly, SOX has a positive and significant correlation with fraud 
duration (+ 0.40, two tailed p < 0.01) and audit tenure (+ 0.57, two tailed p < 0.01), but a negative 
and significant correlation with collusion (- 0.17, two tailed p < 0.05). Thus, fraud cases that 
terminated after the SOX act was passed last longer, involve less perpetrators, and the auditor has 
a shorter tenure with the fraudulent firm.  
[Insert Table 3 - 2 and Table 3 - 3 here] 
4.2. Multivariate Tests 
This study uses Multinomial Logit Regression20, where the charged finding is used as reference 
category, to test hypothesis one (H1). The Multinomial Logit Regression compares the odds of the 
SEC finding that the fraud scheme is concealed from the auditor or the odds of the SEC remaining 
silent to the odds of the SEC charging the auditor. The reference group is ‘charged’, and it is 
compared to ‘concealed’ and ‘silent’ cases. Prior literature compared charged to not charged21, 
whereas this study compares charged to concealed and charged to silent.  
 Hypotheses H1, which argues that the SEC’s auditor related findings are associated with 
fraud characteristics, is tested using Model 1. 
Model 1: 
 
                                                          
20 Based on the auditor’s desirability of the SEC finding, there is a logical order that would provide a ranking of the 
three findings. An auditor would prefer to receive a concealed finding from the SEC, rather than a silent statement, 
and the least desirable is to be charged. Thus, concealed, silent and charged is a logical order from the auditor’s 
perspective. However, it is not possible to use Ordinal Logit Regression as the Proportional Odds assumption is not 
satisfied. 
21 Untabulated results of binary logistic regression, where charged equals 1 and not charged equals 0, replicate the 
same findings as Kedia, Khan and Rajgopal (2017), using the final sample in this study. More specifically, the Big N 
auditors are less likely to be charged by the SEC (βBig N = - 1.99, two-tailed p < 0.01). However, the findings show that 
including a going concern issue (GC) in the audit report does not significantly affect the likelihood of the SEC charging 
or not charging the auditor. Hence, the findings in Eutsler, Nickell and Robb (2016) are not replicated in our sample.  
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SEC_Finding = β0 + β1*FR_DURATION + β2*FR_AMOUNT + β3*COLLUSION + 
β4*REVFraud + β5*AMFraud + β6*DISCFraud + β7*PERP_POSITION + 
β8*FIRM_SIZE + β9*AUDIT_TENURE + β10*GC + β11*BIG-N + 
β12*SOX + ε 
Table 3 - 4 reports the results from multinomial logistic regression, detailed in Model 1. 
The first part of the table reports multinomial regression results when comparing the probability 
of the SEC charging the auditor to the SEC remaining silent regarding the auditor. The results 
indicate partial support for the hypothesis H1. The results show that the coefficients of fraud 
severity indicators, collusion, asset misreporting fraud and perpetrator’s position are significantly 
different from zero, when comparing the odds of the SEC charging the auditor to remaining silent. 
More specifically, the effects of COLLUSION (β3= - 1.77, two-tailed p < 0.01) and AMFraud (β5 
= - 1.20, two-tailed p < 0.05) are negative and significant, whereas PERP_POSITION (β7 = + 2.42, 
two-tailed p < 0.05) is positive and significant. Thus, these results indicate that as the number of 
perpetrators increases, the odds of the SEC remaining silent regarding the auditor decreases 
compared to the odds of the SEC charging the auditor. Also, in asset misreporting fraud type, the 
SEC is less likely to remain silent compared to charging the auditors. Therefore, as fraud 
characteristic changes, the severity of the SEC’s findings increases as well. However, the opposite 
it true regarding the perpetrator’s position. In fraud cases perpetrated by top executives, the SEC 
is more likely to remain silent than to charge the auditors. Perpetrators in higher positions receive 
less severe finding from the SEC. The remaining fraud severity indicators do not have a significant 
association with the SEC’s findings.  
The second part of Table 3 - 4 reports regression results when comparing the probability 
of the SEC charging the auditor to the SEC finding that the fraud scheme was concealed from the 
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auditor. Among the fraud characteristic indicators, only the coefficient of the asset misreporting 
indicator is negative and significant (β5 = - 0.83, two-tailed p < 0.1). Thus, in asset misreporting 
fraud type, the SEC is less likely to find that the fraud scheme is concealed from the auditor 
compared to charging the auditors.  
The results are not consistent with the outcome-penalty accountability framework 
employed by the SEC against the auditors and as argued by Peecher et al. (2013) because only 
some of the fraud characteristic indicators are significantly associated with higher probability of 
the SEC charging the auditor. Hence, the SEC’s finding regarding the auditor is not affected by 
the fraud scheme characteristics. Indicating further that the auditors’ accountability framework is 
more consistent with a process-reward framework, where the auditors are rewarded for the 
procedures followed during the auditing process despite the ultimate result of not detecting FRF 
during the auditing procedures. In support of this conclusion, the results indicate that the 
coefficient on auditor type is positive and significant when comparing the odds of the SEC 
charging the auditor, first, to the odds of the SEC remaining silent (β9 = + 2.96, two-tailed p < 
0.01), and second, to the odds of the SEC finding that the fraud scheme was concealed from the 
auditor (β9 = + 1.86, two-tailed p < 0.01). Kedia et al. (2017) finds the same results regarding Big 
N auditors. The authors find that the SEC is less likely to charge Big-N auditors, and when Big-N 
auditors are charged, the SEC pursues less severe outcomes as compared to other auditors. Lastly, 
the relatively small percentage of the fraud cases where the auditor is charged, supports my 
conclusion that, more often than not, the auditor is not charged for subsequently detected fraud 
cases, but it is reworded instead.  




Publicly traded companies are required to have their financial statements audited by an 
independent auditor prior to filing them with the SEC. The SEC has continuously emphasized the 
fundamental role that the auditors play in achieving its mission to protect investors and the capital 
markets. In 2013, the SEC introduced Operation Broken Gate and Financial Reporting and Audit 
Task Force to oversee auditor’s performance, which increased substantially the number of the 
enforcements issued against the auditors. Yet the SEC names the auditor, in as low as 17% of total 
enforcements issued against fraudulent firms (Eutsler et al. 2016; Kedia et al. 2017). As such, there 
exists a discrepancy between the SEC’s emphasis on the auditors’ role as a gatekeeper and the total 
enforcements issued against the auditors. In this study we examine the accountability framework 
used by the SEC in issuing enforcements against the auditor. In a theoretical study, Peecher et al. 
(2013) observes that the regulatory entities, such as the SEC use an outcome-penalty accountability 
framework to assess auditors’ performance. The penalties that the auditors face from the regulatory 
entities, such as fines, punitive damages and license removal, are determined based on the audit 
outcome, such as adverse financial statement outcome, which include bankruptcy, fraud or 
decrease in market capitalization. Further the authors suggest that the regulatory entities should 
employ a process-reward accountability framework, where the auditors are rewarded based on the 
attributes of auditors’ judgement processes, such as use of innovative audit procedures.  
The results indicate a weak association between the fraud characteristics and the SEC’s 
findings. Collusion among perpetrators and asset misreporting fraud schemes increase the 
probability of the SEC charging the auditor as compared to the probability of being silent. Whereas 
the perpetrator’s executive position decreases the probability of the SEC charging the auditor as 
compared to the probability of being silent. Overall, only a few fraud characteristics affect the 
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SEC’s finding regarding the auditor, which is not consistent with the current auditor accountability 
framework being an outcome-penalty framework. In contrast, the auditor type, being a Big N 
auditor or not, significantly affects the SEC’s findings. More specifically, the results show that the 
SEC is more likely to remain silent or state that the fraud scheme is concealed for Bing N than 
non-Big-N auditor, as compared to charging the auditor. Given that Big-N auditors are found to 
provide better quality audits in prior studies, the findings are more consistent a process-reward 
accountability framework. 
This study makes two important contributions. First, the findings of this study provide 
empirical insights into the discussion of whether the current regulatory system relies on audit 
outcomes or on attributes of auditors’ judgment processes. The SEC’s aim in issuing enforcements 
against the auditor is to improve audit quality by holding auditors accountable. The accountability 
framework, employed by the regulatory bodies in disciplining auditors, impacts audit quality. 
Second, the findings provide insights to auditors in managing risks in subsequently detected FRF. 
When auditors fail to supply high audit quality, they face serious consequences. It is important that 
auditors take additional steps, during audit procedures, to reduce the risks associated with high-
risk clients that were not identified during the client acceptance process. Thus, in an attempt to 
minimize engagement risk, it is essential for auditors to understand what aspects of audit process 
would decrease their likelihood to be named as a defendant by the SEC. 
There are several limitations to this study. First, very little is known about the SEC’s 
enforcement process against the auditors. There exists the probability that fraud characteristic 
indicators, other than the ones examined in this study, affect the SEC’s decision-making process, 
when examining the auditor’s responsibility in failing to detect FRFs. Second, the sample in this 
study includes over 25 years of FRF from 1985 until 2012. Several economic, legal and social 
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factors have changed during this period, while this study only controls for the passage of SOX Act. 
This limitation is partially addressed with a pre- and post-SOX comparison. Third, the cases where 
the SEC neither charges the auditor nor state that the fraud was concealed from them, is a catch all 
category. There are many potential explanations why the SEC does not make any statement 
regarding the auditor, which are not identify and control for in this study. AAERs/LRs do not have 
a standardized form for the information disclosed. Therefore, a silent finding might be a 
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Variable Measurement Data Source 
DV - Dependent Variable  
SEC_FINDING It equals 0 if the SEC charges the auditor, 1 if the SEC remains 





IV- Fraud Characteristics  
Fraud Duration 
(FR_DURATION) 





Natural logarithm of the total dollar value of the amount of 




The number of perpetrators involved in the fraud scheme 
calculated as the sum of three separate indicator variables. 
IFP dataset 
Fraud Type        
(REVFraud) 
Indicator variable equals to 1 if the fraud scheme involved 
revenue misreporting, and 0 otherwise.   
Dechow dataset 
Fraud Type        
(AMFraud) 
Indicator variable equals to 1 if the fraud scheme involved asset 
misreporting, and 0 otherwise.   
Dechow dataset 
Fraud Type        
(DISCFraud) 
Indicator variable equals to 1 if the fraud scheme involved 




Indicator variable equals to 1 if the perpetrator is the CEO, 
COO or the president of the fraudulent firm, and 0 otherwise. 
IFP dataset 
CV – Control Variables  
Firm Size 
(FIRM_SIZE) 
The ratio of total revenues over the total assets on the year prior 
to the first misreported year or year prior to that in cases where 




The number of consecutive years an auditor audited the same 





Indicator variable equals to 1 if the auditor issued a going 





Indicator variable equals to 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 
firms, i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, 
KPMG LLP and Deloitte & Touche LLP, or Arthur Andersen 
LLP, and 0 otherwise 




Variable Measurement Data Source 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) 
Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the fraud scheme 
















































0 = Otherwise) 











Big N (Binary 
Variable: 1 = 
Big N auditor; 
0 = Otherwise)  











against auditors.  
1996 - 
2009 
SEC is less likely to name a Big 
N auditor as a defendant, and to 
impose harsh penalties on 
them. Overall, SEC relies more 
on administrative proceedings 
than tougher civil proceedings, 






AUDAAER  GCO (Binary 
Variable: 1 = 
auditor issued 
a GC opinion; 
0 = otherwise) 
Firm Characteristics: Size, 
Bankruptcy, FOREIGN, 
ZSCORE, REC_INV, 




Auditor Characteristics: BIGN, 
AUDTEN. 




34 included a GC; 
12  included both 
an enforcement 
against the 
auditor and a GC. 
1995 - 
2012 
GC report modification 
accompanying the last set of 
fraudulently stated financials 
are associated with a greater 
likelihood of enforcement 
action against the auditor. 
Auditors may be penalized for 
documenting their awareness of 
fraud risk when FS are later 





SEC_DIS  AUD_CLASS: 
auditor’s size; 
DIV (Binary 
Variable: 1 = 
auditor is 
AICPA; 0 = 
otherwise)  
Violation Type: FALSIFY, 
AR_OVER, DISCL. 
91 enforcement 





1982 -1991 Larger auditors and auditors 
who were members of the 
AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms had a lower likelihood of 
SEC sanctions. Also, disclosure 









Variable Definitions:  
FR_DURATION = the number of quarterly financial statements misreported by the fraudulent firm; 
FR_AMOUNT = natural logarithm of the total misreported amount or total misappropriated assets;   
COLLUSION = number of perpetrators involved in the fraud scheme; 
FR_TYPE = three separate indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraud scheme involved misreporting of revues, assets or fail to disclose relevant 
information in the financial statements, and 0 otherwise.   
PERP_POSITION = indicator variable where it is equal to 1 if the perpetrator is the CEO, COO or the president of the fraudulent firm and 0 
otherwise. 
FIRM_SIZE = measure as the ratio of total revenues over the total assets on the year prior to the first misreported year or year prior to that in 
cases where data was missing. 
AUDIT_TENURE = the number of consecutive years an auditor audited the same client until the last year of the fraud duration. 
GC = indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the auditor issued a going concern in the audit report, and 0 otherwise.  
BIG-N = indicator variable, where it equals 1 if independent auditor is part of the Big 4 firms, i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Ernst & 
Young LLP, KPMG LLP and Deloitte & Touche LLP, and also Arthur Andersen LLP, and 0 otherwise 

















Table 3 - 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
(n = 196) 
 
 
Variables are defined in Table 3 - 1 and Appendix A.
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
 
1                          1 = FR_DURATION 
2 
  0.38**             




0.06 0.05            




  - 0.24**  0.01  0.06           




 0.01  0.07  0.13 - 0.26**          




 0.09  0.18*  0.11 - 0.15* 0.06         




 0.14  0.11  0.75** 0.13 0.11  0.09        





0.01  - 0.19** - 0.02 -0.08  0.08  0.08 - 0.14       




0.40**   0.19** - 0.21**  - 0.21**  0.07  0.08 -0.11 - 0.04      





- 0.20**  - 0.24**  0.05 - 0.07   0.04 - 0.05 0.03  0.13 - 0.05     




 0.08  0.25**   - 0.21** - 0.05   0.01   0.12 - 0.23**   - 0.09  0.25** - 0.22**    




0.40**  0.13 - 0.17* - 0.19**  0.08 - 0.06 - 0.03   - 0.01 0.57** - 0.06 0.06   
 12 = 
 
SOX 
                      
 
  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
 





Table 3 - 4: Multinomial Logit Regression - SEC’s Auditor Related Findings and Fraud Characteristics.  
 (n = 196) 
 
____________________________ 
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, for two-tailed test. 
a regression coefficient, b standard error, c odds ratio and d confidence interval.   
  Silent   Concealed 
Variables Ba SEb ORc 95% CId   Ba SEb ORc 95% CId 
Intercept 0.54 2.48         2.36 1.96       
Fraud severity                       
FR_DURATION 0.01 0.03 1.01 [0.95, 1.07]   0.00 0.03 1.00 [0.95, 1.05] 
FR_AMOUNT -0.07 0.14 0.93 [0.71, 1.22]   -0.15 0.12 0.86 [0.68, 1.08] 
COLLUSION -1.77 0.50*** 0.17 [0.06, 0.46]   -0.14 0.40 0.87 [0.40, 1.91] 
                       FR_TYPE:                       
REVfraud -0.43 0.62 0.65 [0.19, 2.20]   0.12 0.52 1.13 [0.41, 3.16] 
AMfraud -1.20 0.66** 0.30 [0.08, 1.08]   -0.83 0.50* 0.44 [0.16, 1.15] 
DISCfraud -0.20 0.58 0.82 [0.26, 2.57]   -0.17 0.48 0.85 [0.33, 2.16] 
PERP_POSITION (Top_Exe.) 2.42 0.95** 11.26 [1.76, 71.98]   0.69 0.80 1.99 [0.42, 9.44] 
Control Variables                       
FIRM_SIZE 0.71 0.37* 2.04 [1.00, 4.18]   0.47 0.30 1.60 [0.88, 2.90] 
AUDIT_TENURE -0.20 0.15 0.81 [0.61, 1.09]   -0.06 0.12 0.94 [0.74, 1.20] 
GC 0.41 0.88 1.51 [0.27, 8.52]   0.66 0.70 1.94 [0.49, 7.64] 
BIG-N 2.96 0.82*** 19.21 [3.88, 95.04]   1.87 0.56*** 6.47 [2.14, 19.58] 
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 When high-profile fraud cases were detected in the early 2000s, many victim organizations 
rushed to replace their top executives. Some executives resigned voluntarily while others were 
terminated. For instance, Enron’s CEO, Jeffrey Skilling had resigned in August 2001, a few 
months before accounting manipulations were revealed to the public. WorldCom’s CEO, Bernard 
Ebbers, resigned right after the fraudulent scheme had become public, and CFO, Scott Sullivan, 
was terminated at the same time. HealthSouth’s CEO, Richard Scrushy, and CFO, Weston Smith, 
were terminated weeks after the fraud scheme had become public information.  At the same time, 
there were many other victim organizations, such as First USA Inc., 3COM, Boston Scientific, and 
Bausch and Lomb that did not terminate their CEOs or CFOs after the detection of accounting 
scandals (Agrawal and Cooper 2017).  
Organizations, the victims of occupational fraud, choose whether and how to punish 
perpetrators involved in fraud schemes. The purpose of this study is to examine the factors that are 
associated with the victim organization’s decision to pursue a particular outcome against the 
principal perpetrator. Prior research has shown that crime severity is positively related to outcome 
severity and that this relationship is moderated by the perpetrator’s characteristics (Albonetti 1998; 
Wheeler, Weisburd, Waring and Bode 1988; Hagan and Parker 1985). The outcomes of white-
collar crime cases, such as occupational frauds, are often situation-specific (Holtfreter, Piquero 
and Piquero 2008b) and vary by the victim and perpetrator characteristics (Agrawal and Cooper 
2017; Beneish 1999; Garrett 2015; Hermanson, Justice, Ramamoorti and Riley 2017; Holtfreter 
2005; Karpoff et al. 2008). Victim organizations determine which outcomes to pursue against the 
perpetrators, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, such as the severity of the fraud 
and the perpetrator’s status. Further, victim organizations need to consider the cost-benefit of 
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deterrence measures (Rae and Subramanian 2008), such as physical and monitoring controls 
(Townsley and Birks 2008), and how the organizational type affects the punishment pursued 
(Beneish, Marshall and Yang 2017). Punishment outcomes, such as termination and/or criminal 
prosecution, may generate short-term or long-term costs to the organization and may impact the 
level of scrutiny that the victim organization faces from outside stakeholders (Holtfreter 2008a; 
Dugan and Gibbs 2009). Thus, in addition to fraud severity and the perpetrator’s status, different 
types of organizations pursue different outcomes, based on a cost-benefit analysis.   
We use General Crime Theory and Status Characteristics Theory to examine the impact of 
fraud severity, the perpetrator’s status, and the organization type on the victim organization’s 
decision to pursue an outcome against the principal perpetrator. The first part of our study 
examines the main effects of these three factors on the outcome pursued, whereas the second part 
of the study explores how the perpetrator’s status or organization type interact with the association 
of severity and outcome severity in occupational fraud cases. To our knowledge, no prior study 
has examined these interactions in an occupational fraud setting. 
We use the occupational fraud data obtained from the Institute for Fraud Prevention (IFP). 
The data are collected by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) through a biennial 
survey of Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs). The sample in our study includes fraud cases 
investigated from the beginning of 2002 until October 2015. Survey participants responded to 80 
questions on their largest occupational fraud case investigation completed within two years prior 
to the survey date. Our final sample consists of 2,096 fraud cases. The principal perpetrator does 
not face any outcome in 217 fraud cases (10.4 percent), is terminated in 535 fraud cases (25.5 
percent), and is both terminated and criminally prosecuted in 1,344 fraud cases (64.1 percent). In 
most fraud cases, the principal perpetrator faces harsh consequences by losing their employment 
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and facing criminal prosecution. Yet, in over 10 percent of the cases, the victim organization 
decides to neither terminate the principal perpetrator nor to file any charges against him/her. 
According to the ACFE survey, 88.7 percent of the fraud cases reported involve asset 
misappropriation (11.3 percent are non-AM), which last for an average of 25.6 and are committed 
by an average of 2.4 individuals.  
 We use multinomial logistic regression to examine the moderating effects of the perpetrator 
status or the type of organization on the association between the occupational fraud outcome 
pursued by victim organizations and the attributes of the fraud scheme. We find that as fraud 
severity increases, the severity of the outcome pursued against the principal perpetrator increases 
as well. However, victim organizations pursue less severe outcomes against high status 
perpetrators, as compared to low status perpetrators in fraud cases with a short duration. As the 
fraud duration increases, however, victim organizations pursue equally severe outcomes against 
all perpetrators. Lastly, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held organizations are more 
likely to pursue no outcome against principal perpetrators as compared to publicly traded 
organizations. However, governmental and not-for-profit organizations are more likely to 
terminate and criminally prosecute the principal perpetrators, pursuing harsher outcomes. We 
conclude that the fraud outcome is determined not only by the severity of the fraud act, but also 
by the status of the perpetrator who committed the fraud and the type of the victim organization.  
These findings matter to CFEs, organizational leaders, and the anti-fraud profession. CFEs 
and organizational leaders designing and implementing anti-fraud controls often refer to the 
ACFE’s Report to the Nations (2018) for the descriptive statistics of current occupational fraud 
trends to monitor who commits occupational fraud, where, and how. During their work, CFEs are 
often engaged to oversee fraud examinations on behalf of organizations, including advising which 
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outcome to pursue, given the facts and circumstances of the case. CFEs advising clients on fraud 
examinations benefit from considering these inputs and their interactions when helping clients 
select an appropriate outcome. This study adds context to the ACFE’s Report to the Nations 
(2018), which serves the anti-fraud profession, by showing interactions between the occupational 
fraud characteristics, the perpetrator’s status, and the punishment selected. 
This study also enhances researchers’ understanding of victim organizations’ reactions to 
fraudulent instances. Enforcement agencies, regulators, investors, and other stakeholders may also 
benefit from the results of our study when they consider pursuing outcomes against individual or 
organizational perpetrators. Our findings extend the application of general crime theory to a 
specific type of white-collar crimes (i.e. occupational fraud). By being first to examine the 
interaction of fraud severity, the perpetrator’s status, and the victim organization type, we also 
generate ideas for a potential extension and future fraud research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of general crime 
theory, developed in criminology literature, and its application in white-collar crime literature. It 
also develops the hypotheses about the main effects and the interaction effects of fraud severity, 
the perpetrator’s status, and the organization type on outcome severity. Section 3 describes the 
sample and the empirical model used in this study. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 







2.0 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 General Crime Theory 
General crime theory argues that punishment for wrongdoing provides recompense or retribution 
for the victim and society (Retributive Theory), acts as a deterrence against future offense 
(Deterrence/Utilitarian Theory), and reforms the criminal (Reformative Theory) (Green 1999; 
Skoczylis 2008; Bedau 1978; Hart 1959). Retributive, deterrence, and reformative theories provide 
general guidance on punishment. Specifically, retributive theory explains that punishment severity 
should be related to crime severity (Bedau 1978) while deterrence theory suggests that punishment 
types yield varying costs and benefits to the society, the victim, and the perpetrator (Carlsmith, 
Darley and Robinson 2002). Finally, reformative theory emphasizes the need to not only correct 
the current behavior, but also reform the criminal to prevent future wrongdoing (Sabbagh and 
Schmitt 2016). Figure 4 - 1 shows a diagram of general crime theory and its underlying theories. 
General crime theory provides a broad view of crime and punishment as well as 
recompense for actions at the societal level; it does not, however, consider individual facts and 
circumstances of the related cases. Cahill (2007) addresses this issue in his decomposition of 
retributive theory into three ways criminals receive “just deserts” for their wrongdoing (also known 
as the principle of proportionality): the absolutionist view, the threshold view, and the 
consequentialist view. The absolutionist model states that every crime should have a 
commensurate penalty, regardless of external circumstances. Similarly, Cahill (2007) explains that 
the threshold model argues that the deviation from the “just deserts” principle should be avoided 
when possible and assigned in an ordinal manner when not possible so that the most serious crimes 
are dealt with first. The consequentialist view, however, seeks to find a balance between punishing 
the most crimes (absolutionist) and punishing the severest crimes (threshold) by considering the 
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costs of the apprehension and the severity of the offense before administering the consequences 
for the crimes (Cahill 2007).  
[Insert Figure 4-1 here] 
 
These theories hold across disciplines and have been cited in philosophy, sociology, 
criminology, and criminal justice literature (Carlsmith 2008; Gromet and Darley 2009; Carlsmith 
et al. 2002) as they provide context with which to measure punishment.  
2.2 Status Characteristics Theory   
Status characteristics theory (SCT) describes the perceptions one forms when encountering 
another based on the second person’s age, race, gender, and/or position that guide the first person’s 
beliefs about the second person’s capabilities (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch 1971). Berger et al. 
(1971) define a status characteristic as “a characteristic that is differentially evaluated and implies 
possession of other characteristics” (p.3) and a diffuse status characteristic as one that produces 
general assumptions about the second person. First impressions of others are often based on status 
characteristics as “attributes of appearance that are easily observed (i.e. do not require close 
inspection) and show clear differences among interactants” (Ridgeway 1991, p.372).  Status 
characteristics also capture beliefs and perceptions about a target individual’s influence over 
decisions (Berger et al. 1971) that are developed through interpersonal interactions (Ridgeway 
1991). During these interactions, individuals form schemas, or mental descriptions, of each other 
that categorize traits and behavioral profiles (Ridgeway 2001) related to the perceived position or 
authority. It is important to note that these schemas or beliefs about another’s competency need 
not be accurate or correct to influence interactions. For instance, status research consistently finds 
that men, whites, the middle aged, those who are highly educated, and those who are physically 
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attractive are associated with greater expectations of ability even if this is not objectively the case 
(Berger and Webster 2006). 
In the workplace, status characteristics may include the target’s physical features as well 
as their position within the company. The position within the company is correlated with the 
individual’s education, tenure, and age and is the most salient of these status characteristics. 
Webster and Driskell (1978) explain that when a target possesses multiple status characteristics, 
the most salient characteristic to the domain determines the perceptions others have of his/her 
abilities and influence over decisions. Therefore, the perceived influence one has over others in 
the workplace is derived from a combination of his/her status characteristics, with an emphasis on 
the position within the company.  
SCT explains how the perceived seriousness of an occupational (i.e. workplace) fraud, and 
therefore related punishment, may differ between perpetrators. Specifically, the evaluator may 
believe a perpetrator should have a harsher or more lenient punishment, depending on perceived 
status characteristics. Prior literature shows that perpetrators with different statuses receive 
different levels of punishment, even when the crimes are similar in severity. Eitle (2000) finds that 
the position within the victim organization influences the punitive response. For example, Garrett 
(2015) finds that management-level offenders are more frequently penalized than their executive-
level counterparts. Dilks, McGrimmon and Thye (2015) examines accumulative differences in 
diffuse and specific status characteristics between criminals and offenders, finding that the higher 
the offenders’ status in relation to the victim, the less serious their crime is perceived to be. 
Likewise, Weisburd, Waring and Wheeler (1990)  find that officers are less likely to be imprisoned 
for white-collar crimes than workers or managers. Longer jail sentences are also noted by 
Gottschalk (2012) for lower status white-collar criminals, when comparing fraud to other types of 
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white-collar crimes. Thus, while status characteristics describe the perceived ability and influence 
an individual has, evaluators also consider status characteristics in judgement decisions. 
In fact, extant literature finds that the status variance among occupational fraudsters indeed 
affects the punishment that they face due to the influence that higher status individuals have on 
others and the opportunities they are afforded. Rosenmerkel (2001) finds that some of the 
respondent’s characteristics, such as “age, gender, and SES have a slight effect” (p. 320) on the 
relationship between crime severity and punishment severity. In a study of federal white-collar 
crime cases in seven separate districts, Albonetti (1998) explains that the perpetrator’s 
characteristics have a significant direct effect on the severity of the assigned punishment. 
Opportunities available for occupational fraud via the perpetrator’s position further affect the 
consequences that the perpetrators experience (Hagan and Parker 1985). Davis and Pesch (2013) 
find that the “social influence of the individuals” (p. 481) in an organization also affects the 
likelihood of fraud. Whether there is a negative or positive association between the perpetrator’s 
status and punishment severity, these prior studies show that the differences in the perpetrators’ 
positions create different perceptions of the perpetrators’ abilities and influence, in part because of 
the opportunities that the perpetrators have to engage in fraud, which results in varying 
punishments.  
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
2.3.1.  Outcome severity, fraud severity, the perpetrator’s status, and the organization type 
Retributive theory is the form of general crime theory that explains the relationship 
between punishment and crime and states that punishment severity should be related to crime 
severity (Bedau 1978). The consequentialist view of retributive theory considers the costs of the 
apprehension and the severity of the offense before administering the consequences for the crimes 
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(Cahill 2007). It provides a rich context for the administration of justice by going beyond the 
issuance of punishment for the sake of recompense and considering the “micro-analytic and 
context sensitive” (Fondacaro and O'Toole 2015) components of the crime. The consequentialist 
view also assimilates deterrence for the individual criminal through censure or shame (Von Hirsch 
1992).  
The consequentialist view of retributive theory fits white-collar crimes because of its 
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the crime, such as the perpetrator’s motive and 
opportunities (Benson and Moore 1992; Coleman 1987), to commit and conceal their offenses.  
One type of white-collar crimes is occupational fraud, classified by the ACFE as asset 
misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement fraud (ACFE 2018). Following the 
consequentialist view of retributive theory, occupational fraud punishments vary by the facts and 
circumstances of each case (Holtfreter et al. 2008; Rossi et al. 1985).  
Prior literature has shown that termination rates, criminal sentences, and the likelihood of 
civil remedies differ based on crime types (a proxy for crime severity), the perpetrator’s  
characteristics (Agrawal and Cooper 2017; Garrett 2015; Karpoff et al. 2008b), and the victim 
organization’s characteristics. Prior literature also argues that a positive relationship exists 
between crime severity and punishment severity (Wheeler, et al. 1988; Weisburd et al. 1990; 
Tillman and Pontell 1992; Hagan and Parker 1985).  Separately, extant literature shows that the 
status advantage of a perpetrator becomes a liability for the received punishment. McGrimmon, 
Dilks and Schmidt (2018) find that the status within the organization can subsequently become a 
liability when the perpetrator’s job position (i.e. status) is instrumental in committing the deviant 
act. Finally, while prior literature has not examined the impact of the victim organization type on 
punishment severity, Benson and Madensen (2007) explain that varying situations provide varying 
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opportunities for crime and that perpetrators of organizational crime have more access than 
traditional criminals. Therefore, we hypothesize that there are main effects of fraud severity, the 
perpetrator’s status, and the organization type on the severity of fraud outcomes. Hypothesis 1 
(H1a, b, c) follows:  
H1a: Fraud perpetrators face outcomes equal to the severity of their fraud act.  
 
H1b: Fraud perpetrators with higher status face less severe outcomes than 
perpetrators with lower status.  
 
H1c: Compared to publicly traded organizations, fraud perpetrators in 
privately held, governmental and not-for-profit organizations face less 
severe outcomes.  
2.3.2.  Fraud severity and the perpetrator’s status impact on outcome severity 
We rely on the consequentialist view of retributive theory to examine the relationship 
between occupational fraud seriousness and outcome severity, and whether the relationship differs 
based on the perpetrator’s status or the victim organization type. Based on the consequentialist 
view of retributive theory and its application in occupational frauds, we argue that the severity of 
punishment is determined not only by the severity of fraud but also by the perpetrator’s status or 
the victim organization type (Eitle 2000; Dilks et al. 2015; Arnulf and Gottschalk 2013; van 
Prooijen and Lam 2007; Roberts and Lyons 2009). Crime attributes and perpetrator characteristics 
have separately been shown to have direct effects on punishment (Eitle 2000; Roberts and Lyons 
2009); Holtfreter 2008b).  We examine various status characteristics, including the position within 
the company to test these findings.  
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The ACFE (2018) reports that 19 percent of the fraud cases in their survey were committed 
by owners/executives, 34 percent by managers, and 44 percent by employees. Further, it reports 
that the gender split of the perpetrators is 69 percent male and 31 percent female. Finally, although 
occupational fraudsters are more educated than street criminals, the ACFE report finds that 24 
percent have a high-school or lower education. These status differences within occupational 
fraudsters yield the varying punishment severity for similar acts. However, as previously 
explained, the status becomes a liability (McGrimmon et al. 2018) when it is used to engage in 
wrongdoing. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:  
H2: Both the fraud scheme and the perpetrators’ status impact victim 
organization’s decision in pursuing an outcome against fraud perpetrators.   
2.3.3.  Fraud severity and the organization type impact on outcome severity 
The complexity of the crime environment has also been shown to have a positive 
relationship with punishment severity (Albonetti 1998). In occupational frauds, the victim 
organization is the crime environment. Kennedy (2014) explains that perpetrators gain a deep 
knowledge of the victim organization through their occupational duties. This knowledge enables 
the perpetrator to develop a cognitive map (Brantingham and Brantingham 1993) of when, where, 
and how to commit occupational fraud without being detected by internal controls, as well as 
increasing his or her ability to conceal the crime (Benson and Madensen 2007). Organizations 
employ internal controls in lieu of societal controls to reduce the situational opportunities available 
for crimes to occur (Holtfreter 2005; Benson and Madensen 2007; Fleming, Hermanson, 
Kranachar and Riley 2016); however, those internal controls vary by the type of the organization 
(Fleming et al 2016).  
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The complexity of internal controls employed by an organization may be affected by the 
regulatory requirements for the organization. For example, Fleming et al. (2016) find that publicly 
traded companies employ stronger anti-fraud measures than their privately-held counterparts. This 
is likely because of the level of public scrutiny that these organizations face and their structural 
complexity. Where there is a “high public visibility, organizational decisions may be shaped by” 
(Holtfreter 2008b, p. 309) formal sanctions, as public companies may suffer from reputation 
damage if their control environment is not strong (Dugan and Gibbs 2009). Separately, more 
complex organizational structures may have more complex control systems to help identify the 
individuals responsible for certain activities. Dugan and Gibbs (2009) show that the separation of 
duties amongst many employees in corporations reduces the ability to identify those responsible 
for wrongdoing.  They explain that “attention must be paid to the organizational structure to 
determine the viability of” (Dugan and Gibbs, 2009, p.118) crime controls. Each situation is 
different, causing the level of control to vary by the victim organization type and the punishment 
severity to vary correspondingly. 
In addition to the organizational considerations of internal controls, deterrence theory 
explains that the punishments pursued against criminals are chosen based on cost-benefit analyses 
(Rae and Subramanian 2008; Townsley and Birks 2008). Harsher prevention and deterrence 
measures often incur higher costs in the short-term but may decrease costs in the long-term by 
sending a strong anti-fraud message. Organizations prefer lower cost alternatives for prevention 
and deterrence and will likely select occupational fraud outcomes that limit their overall costs 
(Beneish et al. 2017). Such costs may include preventative anti-fraud measures, such as the cost 
of physical and process controls (Townsley and Birks 2008); detective anti-fraud measures, such 
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as the costs of anomaly identification (Becker 1968; Kim and Kogan 2014); or costs associated 
with employee turnover or damaged reputation (Desai, Hogan and Wilkins 2006a).  
We focus on the costs and benefits of terminating or criminally prosecuting the employee 
who perpetrated the fraud. A victim organization that pursues the termination and/or criminal 
prosecution will incur greater short-term costs through attrition, legal fees, time spent by current 
employees, and a loss of good reputation, but the message sent may reduce future fraudulent 
behavior and the likelihood of legal actions by third parties. Therefore, organizations with more 
complex internal control systems, or those subject to regulatory oversight, such as governmental 
entities or publicly traded companies, may be more willing to incur higher short-term costs by 
sending strong signals through harsh punishment. Incurring high short-term costs may prevent 
much larger long-term costs (Karpoff et al. 2008b). At the same time, taking no action against a 
fraud perpetrator will result in no cost in the short-term, but it may send a signal to other employees 
and stakeholders that the company condones or dismisses fraudulent behavior, which may result 
in long-term costs through the furtherance of fraudulent behavior by other employees or a reaction 
by stakeholders or regulatory agencies. In some cases, victim organizations may elect to retain an 
occupational fraudster to avoid the short-term costs of replacement (Beneish et al. 2017).  
While there is debate as to whether the severity of a crime is more heavily influenced by 
the fraud characteristics or the crime environment (Benson and Moore 1992), we contend in 
hypothesis 3 (H3) that it is the interaction of these attributes that has the greatest impact on our 
punishment measure, occupational fraud outcomes. 
 
H3: Both the fraud scheme and the type of organization impact victim 
organization’s decision in pursuing an outcome against fraud perpetrators.   
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Figure 4 - 222 illustrates the association among fraud severity, the perpetrator’s status, the 
organization type, and the fraud outcomes pursued by the victim organization.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 - 2 here] 
3.0 MODELS AND SAMPLE 
3.1 Sample 
 The sample in this study is collected using the survey methodology by the ACFE. The 
ACFE is the world’s largest anti-fraud organization, with more than 80,000 members, mainly 
CFEs. The ACFE has distributed a biennial survey to CFEs since 1993 (ACFE 2016, 1996). 
Participating CFEs are required to answer 80 questions on the single largest fraud case that they 
have investigated and that was closed two years prior to the survey date. In the 2013, 2015 and 
2017 surveys, in addition to the single largest fraud case, the participating CFEs were provided the 
opportunity to report a second fraud case that they investigated. The data collected through this 
biennial survey are available to the academic research community through a data-grant application 
to the Institute for Fraud Prevention (IFP). We obtained the access to the ACFE dataset in January 
2018 through a data-grant proposal presented in November 2017.   
 The ACFE upholds the anonymity of the companies and perpetrators involved in the fraud 
cases and takes steps to protect them. First, the name of the company is not requested in the survey. 
Second, to avoid any reverse identification of any fraud case from the information reported, the 60 
largest fraud cases are deleted from the dataset. Third, to further promote anonymity, the fraud 
                                                          
22 The list of variables used to operationalize each of the four constructs, their measurement, and 
the respective question number on the ACFE survey are summarized in Appendix A.  
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amounts in the sample have been randomized at ±1 percent (Fleming et al. 2016). These measures 
protect the identity of the companies and at the same time make it impossible for researchers to 
link the ACFE dataset to other datasets (e.g., Audit Analytics, Compustat, etc.). Despite this 
limitation, the ACFE dataset is unique. First, the survey used to collect the data is backed by over 
25 years of experience. Second, fraud cases reported in the dataset are global fraud cases. Finally, 
the dataset includes the fraud cases investigated from the beginning of 2002 (ACFE 2004) until 
October 2015 (ACFE 2016), a 14-year period.  
3.2. Empirical Model 
3.2.1. Dependent variable: fraud outcome 
 Occupational fraud outcomes include varying degrees of punishment from no action taken 
to the involuntary loss of employment, or criminal prosecution, or any combination of the two23. 
The two fraud outcomes that we examine in this study are termination and criminal prosecution. 
Termination (TERMINATION) is measured as a multiple response question in the ACFE survey. 
The multiple responses are “termination,” “permitted or required the individual to resign,” 
“probation/suspension,” “restitution agreement,” “no punishment,” “perpetrator had resigned 
before fraud was discovered or action was taken,” and “other.” In our study, TERMINATION 
indicates whether the perpetrator continued to work for the victim organization after the fraud had 
been detected or not. Therefore, “termination24,” “permitted or required the individual to resign” 
and “perpetrator had resigned before fraud was discovered or action was taken” are coded as 1 to 
indicate that the perpetrators no longer works for the victim organization. However, 
                                                          
23ACFE survey data included the civil litigation pursued against the perpetrators by the victim 
organization. Due to the limited data availability, this outcome is not examined in our study. 
24 Termination is defined in our study as no longer working for the organization. 
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“probation/suspension,” “restitution agreement,” and “no punishment” are coded as 0 to indicate 
that the perpetrators still work for the victim organization. Observations that had only “others” as 
a selected response are not included in the final sample. Criminal prosecution (CRIMINAL) is 
measured as an indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the fraud case was referred to law 
enforcement and 0 otherwise.  
Termination and criminal prosecution are non-mutually exclusive outcomes; therefore, our 
dependent variable FRAUDOUTCOME25 takes three different values: no punishment, termination 
only, and termination and criminal prosecution. Criminal prosecution without termination does not 
occur in practice, and as such, it is not considered a possible fraud outcome.  
3.2.2. Independent variables: fraud severity, perpetrator’s status, and organization type 
Occupational frauds differ in duration, yield varying levels of loss to the victim organization, and 
are conducted by employees at all organizational levels. In deciding on the fraud outcome to 
pursue, victim organizations must consider the combination of these situations. 
Fraud Severity 
 The National Survey of Crime Severity (NSCS) (Wolfgang, Figlio, Tracy and Singer 
1985) is regarded as the preeminent ranking of 204 crime scenarios by severity in the United States. 
Participants in the NSCS selected severity scores for 25 of the 204 scenarios and consistently 
deemed property crimes severer when there were multiple victims or when the dollar loss was 
                                                          
25 Observations are deleted as they had only “others” as a selected response, which does not 
indicate whether the perpetrator is terminated or not. Lastly, observations defined as contradictory 
responses are deleted because respondents selected conflicting responses for the termination 
question (Q74). For instance, “no punishment” and “termination” are both chosen as actions taken 
by the victim organization against the principal perpetrator. On the same note, 449 observations 
are deleted as they indicated that the principal perpetrator continued to work for the victim 
organization while being prosecuted criminally. Such a situation is illogical in practice. 
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high. Thus, the severity of occupational frauds, a form of property crime, is measured by the 
number of victims and the resulting financial loss (Wolfgang et al. 1985). According to the ACFE 
(2018), median occupational fraud losses increase as the duration of the fraud increases, when the 
perpetrators engage in complicated fraud schemes such as financial statement fraud, and/or when 
there are multiple offenders. The duration of the fraud and the type of the enacted fraud scheme 
are related to the opportunities afforded in the victim organization’s control environment, whereas 
the number of perpetrators is related to both the opportunities available in the victim organization’s 
control environment and the perpetrator’s characteristics. Other studies define crime severity as 
the duration of the offense, the crime type (Wheeler, et al. 1988; Weisburd et al. 1990), dollar loss 
(Tillman and Pontell 1992), and the number of perpetrators (Hagan and Parker 1985). Therefore, 
occupational frauds also may differ in seriousness, depending on whether they are committed by 
one individual or more than one individual, whether the crime might result in physical harm or 
cause harm to many victims, or whether the duration of or financial damage from the crime is 
above average for the fraud type. Therefore, multiple indicators are used in prior literature to 
measure fraud severity. Following are the indicators we use in this study. 
Fraud Duration and/or Amount (FR_DURATION and FR_AMOUNT): Srinivasan (2005) 
examines the penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their 
companies experience accounting restatements. The authors argue that the director departure is a 
function of restatement severity as measured by the duration of the restatement (i.e. the number of 
quarters for which the net income is restated), and by the magnitude (i.e. the cumulative amount 
of the restated net income scaled by total assets at the year-end before the restatement 
announcement). On the same note, Karpoff et al. (2008b) find that the managers’ likelihood of a 
job loss increases with the cost that  the financial misreporting causes to outside shareholders. We 
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measure Fraud Duration as the number of months the scheme occurred before it was detected. 
Fraud amount is measured as the total sum of misappropriated assets or the amount of the caused 
loss. 
Fraud Type (FR_TYPE): In the first National Survey of Crime Statistics (NSCS), Wolfgang et al. 
(1985) developed a crime severity scale, based on public opinions. They found that respondents’ 
perception of crime seriousness was offense-specific. For example, they found that the asset 
misappropriation of occupational fraud schemes, such as stealing, overbilling, and embezzlement 
was more wrongful than harmful, whereas white-collar crimes committed by corporate offenders, 
such as selling defective products or causing injury through negligence were more harmful than 
wrongful. These results hold regardless of whether or not the respondent was a victim of crime 
(Rosenmerkel 2001). Therefore, the perceived seriousness of occupational frauds differs by type, 
and occupational fraud seriousness differs from the perceived seriousness of other white-collar 
crimes.  We measure fraud type as either asset misappropriation (1) or other (0). 
Collusion (COLLUSION): Perpetrators often co-offend in corruption and financial statement fraud 
schemes but may also collude in asset misappropriation schemes (Free and Murphy 2015). 
Weerman (2003) finds that collusion often occurs as a matter of social exchange. Co-offenders 
band together to accomplish more than a solo offender could on his or her own. Co-offending, or 
collusion, may also occur because the perpetrators have a perceived close tie (Free and Murphy 
2015) to each other or to customers and suppliers (Bishop, Hermanson and Riley 2017). These ties 
facilitate group thinking and in-group behaviors (Gromet and Darley 2009), which can lead to 
cultural or “tone at the top” issues in management control (Cooper, Dacin and Palmer 2013). The 
trust formed between connected perpetrators further fuels social exchange in that each party 
believes the group will stick together or be punished together (Free and Murphy 2015). It is likely 
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that this is the reason most collusive frauds are detected “by tip or complaint, internal audit, law 
enforcement, or by accident” (Bishop et al. (2017), p.18). Trust between co-offenders increases 
the severity of collusive frauds by motivating the participants to collaborate to conceal the crime, 
which reduces the likelihood of punishment (Paternoster 1987), but if detected, it may increase the 
level of punishment (Free and Murphy 2015). We define collusion as the number of perpetrators 
involved in the fraud. 
The Perpetrator’s Status 
The perpetrator’s status characteristics, such as age, economic status, race, gender (Ward 
et al. 2012; Benson and Gottschalk 2015), education, position in the victim organization, prior 
offense history, and behavioral indicators (Arnulf and Gottschalk 2013; Bishop et al. 2017; 
Hermanson et al. 2017; Holtfreter 2005; Piquero and Benson 2004) have been shown to have a 
direct effect on punishment. Rossi, Simpson and Miller (1985) find that the perpetrator’s age and 
gender have both direct effects on the sentence length and indirect effects through the case 
complexity, while the perpetrator’s education has an indirect influence on the sentence length, via 
case complexity. Similarly, Hollow (2014) finds that occupational fraudsters’ positions within the 
company affect their motives. Finally, the ACFE (2018) reports that occupational fraud losses are 
positively related to the perpetrator’s education, position in the organization, and tenure in the 
organization. 
Age and/or Tenure (AGE and TENURE): Prior studies have examined age and/or tenure of board 
members (Srinivasan 2005), CEOs (Beneish et al. 2017), and CFOs and CEOs (Leone and Liu 
2010), when comparing their retention rates in the financial misreporting and control firms. They 
argue that age and/or tenure affect executive turnover (Collins, Masli, Reitenga and Sanchez 
2008). Specifically, Collins et al. (2008) find that CFO age and tenure are significantly associated 
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with the likelihood of CFO turnover. Desai et al. (2006b) compare the age and tenure of the CEO, 
chairman, and President of firms that restate earnings as compared to control firms, arguing that 
longer tenured executives are more difficult to replace. Univariate results show no significant 
difference between restating and control firms. However, in an additional analysis, the authors find 
that CEO age is negatively related to the likelihood of turnover, whereas the coefficient of CEO 
tenure is negatively related to the CEO turnover, but it is non-significant in the presence of CEO 
age in the model. Age is defined in our study as the age of the principal perpetrator at the time of 
the fraud. 
Gender (GENDER): While many status characteristic traits are related to the possession and use 
of power and resources (e.g. tenure, education, position, age, prior convictions), others are nominal 
in nature, such as gender. Differences in nominal characteristics include categories with 
differentiated descriptive attributes that are not socially significant (Ridgeway 1991). Ridgeway 
(1991) explains that gender categories are distinct from other nominal traits as they are “two fairly 
equal groups” (p.382) that interact more frequently than other status groups and endure both the 
between-category as well as within-category bias. Therefore, while gender is deemed a status 
characteristic, it is not directly correlated with power and resources. We include it in our 
calculation of the perpetrator’s status (1 = male, 0 = female) for theoretical and descriptive 
purposes only. 
 Position (POSITION): The position held by the perpetrator affects the fraud outcome as it impacts 
the status of the perpetrator in society. Piquero and Benson (2004) report that an analysis of the 
white-collar offenders in the 1980s revealed that white-collar crime was not an elite crime. On the 
contrary, most of the offenders were members of middle classes with moderate incomes and 
ordinary jobs, such as small-time entrepreneurs and mid-range office workers. In a more recent 
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study, McGrimmon et al. (2018) examine the role of status in the sanctions that perpetrators 
suffered when committing white-collar crime. In the experimental design, the perpetrator’s status 
is measured at two levels: “high status” (the perpetrator was a “lawyer”) and “low status” (the 
perpetrator was a “billing clerk”). Overall, the results indicate that high status perpetrators face 
harsher sanctions than low status perpetrators. We measure the position as an employee, a 
manager, and an owner/executive. 
Education (EDUCATION): Significant educational differences have been documented between 
repeated offenders and first-time offenders (Hermanson et al. (2017). Even though these 
differences have not been correlated with the outcomes, we expect education level to serve as a 
status characteristic and impact the fraud outcomes. We measure education as some college 
education or higher (1), or other (0). 
Prior charges (PRIORCHARG): A considerable number of  white-collar crime offenders are 
argued to be repeat offenders, identified by having had at least two prior official contacts with the 
criminal justice system (Piquero and Benson 2004). In addition, CEOs and CFOs with prior legal 
records are more likely to commit fraud (Davidson, Dey and Smith 2015). Furthermore, predators 
(repeat) and situational (first-time) fraudsters are found to be fundamentally different in several 
dimensions (Hermanson et al. 2017). We expect these differences to be reflected in the outcomes 
faced by the perpetrators. We use a dichotomous variable to show whether the perpetrator had 
prior charges (1) or not (0). 
The Organization Type 
Prior literature examines white-collar victim characteristics, including controls (Kimerling 
et al. 2002; Lyons 2006). Holtfreter (2005) considers the organization size, type (e.g. 
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governmental, non-profit, publicly traded, or private), anti-fraud internal controls, and revenue as 
characteristics of victim organizations in occupational fraud cases. While neither study examines 
the punishments assigned for occupational frauds, these studies show that the variance between 
victim organization environments creates similarly varying opportunities and controls.  
Organization Type (TYPE): The public versus private nature of the victim organization provides 
different opportunities and a lack of opportunities for occupational fraud to occur. Fleming et al. 
(2016) find that public organizations have stronger anti-fraud environments than private 
organizations. Also, public firms experience frauds that involve timing differences and involve a 
larger number of perpetrators. The authors argue that stronger anti-fraud controls force perpetrators 
to use less obvious fraud methods and involve more perpetrators to circumvent the controls. For 
instance, Holtfreter (2005) finds that publicly traded organizations experience more corruption 
than asset misappropriation, whereas non-profit entities experience more asset misappropriation 
cases than either financial statement fraud or corruption. We evaluate the victim organization type 
across four levels: publicly traded company, privately held company, nonprofit organization, and 
governmental agency. 
Control Variables 
Organization Size (SIZE): All prior studies, that examine the consequences to top management in 
misreporting organizations, control for the size of the organization. Some of these studies use 
natural log of sales as a proxy for the firm’s size (Beneish et al. 2017; Leone and Liu 2010) while 
other studies use natural log of net sales (Agrawal and Cooper 2017).  
 Industry (INDUSTRY): The industry, where the victim organization operates, is widely controlled 
for in prior literature (Collins et al. 2008). Most studies match misreporting firms with control 
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firms operating in the same industry (Leone and Liu 2010). We control for the following type of 
industries in this study, banking/financial service, manufacturing, public service, customer service 
and others. 
Antifraud-measures (ANTIFRAUD): Holtfreter (2005) finds that anonymous tip lines and internal 
audits are more successful anti-fraud measures in corruption cases, as opposed to financial 
statement frauds and asset misappropriations. Similarly, Fleming et al. (2016) examine anti-fraud 
internal control differences between publicly traded and privately held companies, and find that 
financial statement frauds in publicly traded companies are complex and require conspicuous 
concealment measures. We tabulate the number of anti-fraud measures employed by victim 
organizations. 
Location (LOCATION): The ACFE data consist of global fraud cases. In our study we control for 
organizations located in the United States of America (equals 1) as compared to locations outside 
the United States of America (equals 0).  
4.0 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Our final sample consists of 2,096 fraud cases. Table 4 - 1 reports the descriptive statistics 
for the full sample, whereas Table 4 - 2 reports the descriptive statistics by outcome pursued 
against the principal fraud perpetrator. The principal perpetrator is neither terminated nor 
criminally prosecuted in 217 fraud cases in our data (10.4 percent), is terminated in fraud cases 
(25.5 percent), and is both terminated and criminally prosecuted in 1,344 fraud cases (64.1 
percent). In most fraud cases, the principal perpetrator faces harsh punishment by losing their 
employment and facing criminal prosecution. Yet, in over 10 percent of the cases, the victim 
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organization decides not to terminate the principal perpetrator and not to file any charges against 
him/her26.  Approximately 88.7 percent of the fraud cases, reported in the ACFE dataset, involve 
asset misappropriation (AM) (11.3 percent are non-AM) that last for an average of 25.6 months 
and are committed by an average of 2.4 individuals.  
 The average age of the principal perpetrator is 41.5 years old, and there is a 65 percent – 
35 percent gender split between males and females, respectively. Principal perpetrators are well 
educated, with 69.8 percent having at least some college education (30.2 percent have high school 
or lower education). Only 11 percent of the principal perpetrators have had prior charges or 
convictions of a fraud-related offense. Most of the perpetrators in the data have an employee or 
managerial position, 42.9 percent and 39.6 percent, respectively. Perpetrators in the position of an 
executive, officer or owner comprise 17.5 percent of the cases in our data.  
 There are four types of organizations that are victims to a fraud scheme in our sample: 
publicly traded, privately held, governmental, and not-for-profit. Publicly traded and privately held 
firms represent the two largest groups at 30.8 percent and 42.5 percent, respectively. Governmental 
and not-for-profit organizations are the two smaller groups, 15.6 percent and 11.1 percent, 
respectively. Lastly, most of the victim organizations (59.2 percent) in our final sample are located 
in the United States., while the remaining 40.8 percent are located outside the United States of 
America.  
 We examine the sample descriptive statistics by outcomes pursued by victim organizations 
and find interesting differences among the three groups. On average, the fraud schemes where 
victim organizations pursue the harshest outcome, i.e. termination and criminal prosecution, cost 
                                                          
26 In these cases, the principal perpetrator avoided being terminated by signing a restitution 
agreement, facing only temporary suspension/probation or facing no punishment at all. 
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more (M = 2.4 natural log of fraud), last longer (M = 27.7 months), and have the highest percentage 
of asset misappropriation schemes (92.7 percent), as compared to the other two outcome groups, 
no outcome and termination only. The median number of perpetrators in the harshest punishment 
group is one, whereas the median number of perpetrators in the other two groups is two. The 
average age of principal perpetrators who did not receive any punishment from the victim 
organization is higher (M = 45 years old) than perpetrators who were only terminated (M = 41.2 
years old) or perpetrators who were terminated and criminally prosecuted (M = 41 years old). Also, 
when comparing the percentage distribution within the groups, the no punishment group has the 
highest percentage of longer tenured, more educated, and higher ranked perpetrators among the 
three groups. The perpetrators who were terminated and criminally prosecuted are the youngest 
among the three groups (M = 41 years old). In comparing the composition of this group, it has the 
highest percentages of low-tenured perpetrators, females, lower-ranked employees, and less 
educated perpetrators, but the highest percentage of perpetrators with prior fraud related charges. 
These univariate comparisons among the groups indicate that the higher status perpetrators tend 
not to receive any punishment from the victim organization, whereas the lower status perpetrators 
tend to receive the harshest punishment, by being terminated and criminally prosecuted.  
Table 4 - 3 reports the Pearson and the Spearman correlation among the independent 
variables.  The results show a statistically significant and positive Pearson correlation between the 
fraud severity indicators and the perpetrator’s status indicators. The fraud duration has a positive 
and significant correlation with the perpetrator’s age (+ 0.34, two tailed p < 0.000) and tenure (+ 
0.36, two tailed p < 0.000). However, the fraud amount has a positive and significant correlation 
with the age (+ 0.29, two tailed p < 0.002) and position (+ 0.33, two tailed p < 0.000) of the 
perpetrator. The perpetrator’s education is significantly and negatively correlated with the fraud 
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amount (- 0.18, two tailed p < 0.000); however, it is positively correlated with the fraud type (+ 
0.12, two tailed p < 0.000). This correlation indicates that the more educated perpetrators commit 
asset misappropriation fraud, which results in a smaller fraud amount than financial statement 
fraud. 
[Insert Table 4 - 1, Table 4 - 2 and Table 4 - 3 here] 
4.2 Multivariate Tests 
 We examine three fraud outcomes that the victim organizations pursue against the principal 
perpetrators in occupation fraud cases: no outcome, termination, and termination and criminal 
prosecution. Based on the severity of the punishment, these three outcomes are ordered from the 
least severe (i.e. no punishment/outcome) to the severest (i.e. termination and criminal 
prosecution) while termination only stands in between. We use Multinomial Logit Regression27, 
where the termination outcome is used as a reference category, to compare the odds of the principal 
perpetrator facing one of the three outcomes. The Multinomial Logit Regression compares the 
odds of the principal perpetrator being terminated to not facing any outcome, and then it compares 
the odds of being terminated to being terminated and criminally prosecuted.  
 First, we test hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c, which argue that there is a main effect of 
fraud severity, the perpetrator’s status, and the victim organization type on fraud outcomes, 
respectively, using Model 1.  
Model 1: 
Fraud Outcome = α + β1*FR_DURATION + β2*FR_AMOUNT + β3*FR_TYPE + β4*COLLUSION + 
β5*AGE + β6*TENURE + β7*GENDER + β8*POSITION + β9*EDUCATION + 
                                                          




β10*PRIORCHARG + β11*ORG_TYPE + β12*ORG_SIZE + β13*INDUSTRY + 
β14*ANTIFRAUD + β15*ORG_LOC + ε 
 Table 4 - 4 reports the results from multinomial logistic regression, which we detail in 
Model 1. The first part of the table reports regression results when comparing no outcome to 
termination only, whereas the second part reports regression results when comparing termination 
only to termination and criminal prosecution. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the 
coefficients of the fraud severity indicators, except for collusion, are positive and significantly 
different from zero, when comparing the odds of the perpetrator being only terminated to being 
terminated and criminally prosecuted. More specifically, the effects of FR_DURATION (β1= + 
0.01, two-tailed p < 0.05), FR_AMOUNT (β2= +0.37, two-tailed p < 0.01), and FR_TYPE (β3 = + 1.16, 
two-tailed p < 0.01) are all positive and significant. Thus, these results indicate that as fraud severity 
increases, the odds of being terminated and criminally prosecuted increase compared to the odds 
only being terminated. Therefore, there is a direct and positive association between the fraud 
severity and the severity of the punishment, consistent with our predictions in H1a.  
 When comparing no outcome to termination only, the coefficients of the fraud severity 
indicators are not significantly different from zero. The lack of significant association between the 
fraud severity indicators can be explained by two main factors. First, the sample of the no outcome 
firms is smaller than the other two groups. More specifically, it only encompasses 10.4 percent of 
the entire sample. Second, the question included in the ACFE surveys asks whether the perpetrator 
was terminated, or any other form of punishment was pursued, such as probation, suspension, or 
restitution agreement. Therefore, the no outcome group included cases where only temporary 
outcomes were pursued.  
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 When comparing the odds of the perpetrators receiving no outcome with being only 
terminated, we find that the coefficient of AGE (β5) is positive (+ 0.03) and significantly different from 
zero (two-tailed p < 0.01). Also, when comparing the odds of being terminated to being terminated and 
criminally prosecuted, the coefficient of AGE (β5) is negative and significant (- 0.02, two-tailed p < 0.05), 
the coefficient of TENURE (β6) is positive and significant (+ 0.28, two-tailed p < 0.05), the coefficient of 
GENDER (β7) is negative and significant (- 0.59, two-tailed p < 0.01), the coefficient of both levels of 
POSITION (β8), employee (+ 0.60, two-tailed p < 0.01)  and manager are positive and significant (+ 0.42, 
two-tailed p < 0.05), the coefficient of EDUCATION (β9) is negative and significant (- 0.52, two-tailed p 
< 0.01), and lastly, the coefficient of PRIORCHARG (β10) is positive and significant (+ 0.95, two-tailed p 
< 0.01). Consistent with our H1b hypothesis, these findings indicate that the perpetrator’s status reduces 
the odds of being terminated and criminally prosecuted compared to only being terminated. Thus, 
older, male, better educated perpetrators, who are in an executive position and have worked for 
the victim organization for more than five years, are less likely to be terminated and criminally 
prosecuted than younger, female, less educated perpetrators, who are in an employee or managerial 
position and have worked for the victim organization for less than five years. Only prior fraud 
charges increase the odds of being terminated and criminally prosecuted as compared to only being 
terminated. Overall, we find that as the perpetrator’s status increases, the odds of being terminated 
and criminally prosecuted decrease. Therefore, there is a direct and negative association between 
the perpetrator’s status and the severity of the punishment as predicted in hypothesis H1b.  
 Consistent with H1c, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE (β11) is positive and significantly different from 
zero. More specifically, when we compare the odds of the perpetrator receiving no outcome to the odds of 
being terminated, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE (β11) is positive and significantly different from zero for 
Governmental Organizations (+ 1.19; two-tailed p < 0.01), Not-for-profit Organizations (+ 0.86; two-tailed 
p < 0.05), and Privately-held Organizations (+ 0.84; two-tailed p < 0.01) when Publicly-held Organizations 
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are used as the reference category. When comparing the odds of the perpetrator being terminated to being 
terminated and criminally prosecuted, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE (β11) is positive and significantly 
different from zero for Governmental Organizations (+ 0.96; two-tailed p < 0.01) and Not-for-profit 
Organizations (+ 0.58; two-tailed p < 0.05). These findings indicate that compared to publicly traded 
organizations, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held organizations are more likely to 
pursue no outcome against the principal perpetrator than to terminate him/her.  
 In other words, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately-held organizations choose 
extreme outcomes against the perpetrators. Governmental and not-for-profit organization are more 
likely to take no action than terminate the perpetrator and are more likely to terminate and 
criminally prosecute the perpetrator than to just terminate the perpetrator. Thus, governmental and 
not-for-profit organizations either decide to pursue no outcome or pursue the harshest outcome 
possible, as compared to just terminating the perpetrator.  
[ Insert Table 4 - 4 here] 
 4.2.1. Graph Distance Theory 
In hypothesis H2, we examine the effect of both the fraud severity and the perpetrator status. To 
test this hypothesis, we construct a composite variable for the perpetrator’s status 
(STATUSCOMP) based on prior literature. Berger, Norman, Balkwell and Smith (1992)  examine 
the impact of status attributes and other characteristics on the task performance expectations. The 
authors used a statistical approach that builds diagrams or graphs that connect the actor’s 
characteristics to the expected task outcomes. Thus, there are various paths from the characteristics 
to the outcomes. These paths are characterized by the sign (positive or negative) and the length 
(various lengths based on how relevant the characteristic is to the task) dubbed graph theoretical 
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distance. Figure 4 - 3 is a graph theoretical representation of one actor’s salient diffused and 
specific status characteristics, adapted from Dilks et al. (2017). In our model, the diffused (D) 
status characteristics are age, tenure, gender, position, and education, whereas the specific (C) 
status characteristic is prior fraud related charges. Next, we determine the length of the paths for 
the diffused and specific variables, which in our case are paths of length three and four for both 
diffused and specific variables.  
[ Insert Figure 4 - 3 here] 
 
  The perpetrator’s (“P’s”) aggregate expectations values28 are reported in Table 4 - 5. Each 
path generates a value between +1 and -1 for the composite variable, depending on the sign and 
the length of the paths. To determine the specific variable combination for each path, we converted 
the perpetrator’s position variable into a binary variable, where it equals to 1 if the perpetrator is 
an employee and zero otherwise. We also split age at 40 years old to obtain a binary variable. The 
6 positive value and 0 negative value path include all cases where a perpetrator has the highest 
value on each of the variables, i.e. male29, older than 40 years old, with some college education, 
has worked for the victim organization for more than 5 years in a managerial or executive position, 
and has no prior charges. The 5 positive values and 1 negative value path includes any perpetrator 
who has at least one negative/low value in one of the indicators, and so on and so forth. The 0 
                                                          
28 The P’s aggregate expectations values are estimated using a worksheet developed by Dr. David 
Melamed at University of Arizona. More information can be found at Melamed, D. (2011). Graded 
status characteristics and expectation states. In Advances in group processes (pp. 1-31). Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
 
29 It is important to emphasize that even though gender is deemed a status characteristic, it is not 
directly correlated with power and resources. We include it in our calculation of the perpetrator’s 
status for theoretical and descriptive purposes only. 
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positive value and 6 negative values path includes females, younger than 40 years old, in an 
employee position, who have worked in the victim organization for less than five years, who do 
not have any college education, and have no prior charges.  
[ Insert Table 4 - 5 here]  
  In our study, graph-theoretical procedure generates a Likert-scale score for the status of the 
perpetrators using the perpetrator’s age, tenure, gender, position, education, and prior charges as 
status characteristics. Values closer to +1 indicate a high status, whereas values closer to -1 indicate 
a low status.  
4.3. Testing for Moderation 
Hypothesis H2 examines whether the main effect of fraud severity on fraud outcomes is 
moderated by the perpetrator’s status. Baron and Kenny (1986)30 is the seminal paper on defining 
moderator variables and providing the statistical method to test for moderation effects. The authors 
explain that moderator variables are third variables that partition a focal independent variable into 
subgroups to obtain the maximum effectiveness on a given dependent variable. In our study, the 
focal independent variable, crime severity, is partitioned initially into subgroups of perpetrators 
with different statuses, i.e. STATUSCOMP is the first moderator variable. Baron and Kenny argue 
that the partition of the focal independent variable by the moderator variable “affects the direction 
and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or 
criterion variable” (Baron and Kenny 1986, pg. 1174). In our study, prior literature has established 
a positive relation between the crime severity and punishment severity. However, status 
                                                          
30 Baron and Kenny (1986) and Preacher and Hayes (2008) are two seminal papers that established 
the distinction between moderator and mediator variables and the statistical method to test for 
moderation or mediation effects. A mediator variable is defined as a mechanism/intervening 
variable through which the independent variable influences the dependent variable.   
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characteristic theory argues that this relation does not hold when crime severity is subdivided into 
groups of perpetrators with different statuses. For instance, the association between crime severity 
and punishment severity is positive in the group of low status perpetrators; however, the relation 
is negative in the group of high-status perpetrators because high status perpetrators have higher 
education and income, which provides them with better tools to appeal the punishment that is 
pursued against them. The same argument is made when crime severity is subdivided into different 
groups of victim organizations. For instance, large publicly held organizations with several anti-
fraud measures have the means to pursue any punishment against the perpetrators; however, small, 
privately held organizations with limited anti-fraud measures have limited means to pursue certain 
punishment against the perpetrators. The statistical method, suggested by Baron and Kenny, to test 
for moderation effects is the creation of an interaction term between the focal independent variable 
and the moderator variable. The moderation effect is supported when the regression coefficient of 
the interaction term is significant.  
Next, we test hypothesis 2 (H2), which examines whether the main effect of fraud severity 
on fraud outcomes is moderated by the perpetrator’s status. In Model 2 we interact 
STATUSCOMP with fraud severity variables. We use this approach to save the degrees of freedom 
and improve the interpretation of the results.   
Model 2:  
Fraud Outcome = α + β1*FR_DURATION + β2*FR_AMOUNT + β3*FR_TYPE + β4*COLLUSION + 
β5*STATUSCOMP + β6*FR_DURATION*STATUSCOMP + 
β7*FR_AMOUNT*STATUSCOMP + β8*FR_TYPE*STATUSCOMP + 
β9*COLLUSION*STATUSCOMP + β10*ORG_TYPE + β11*ORG_SIZE + 
β12*INDUSTRY + β13*ANTIFRAUD + β14*ORG_LOC + ε 
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Table 4 - 6 reports the results from the multinomial logistic regression, which we detail in Model 
2. The first part of the table reports regression results when comparing no outcome to termination 
only, whereas the second part reports regression results when comparing termination only to 
termination and criminal prosecution. In comparing the odds of receiving no punishment to being 
terminated, the coefficient of the interaction term FR_DURATION*STATUSCOMP (β6), 
FR_AMOUNT*STATUSCOMP (β7), FR_TYPE*STATUSCOMP (β8), and COLLUSION*STATUSCOMP 
(β9) is not statistically significant from zero. However, in comparing the odds of being terminated to being 
terminated and criminally prosecuted, we find that the status of the perpetrators interacts with the fraud 
duration, i.e. the coefficient of FR_DURATION*STATUSCOMP is positive (+0.02) and significantly 
different from zero (two-tailed p < 0.01).   Figure 4 - 4 shows the graphic representation of the interaction 
between the fraud duration and the perpetrator’s status.   In fraud cases with a short duration, low status 
perpetrators have a higher probability of being terminated and criminally prosecuted than high status 
perpetrators. As the fraud duration increases, perpetrators with different status have equal probability of 
being terminated and criminally prosecuted.  In low severity cases, low status perpetrators receive a harsher 
punishment than high status perpetrators.  As the fraud severity increases, perpetrators with different 
statuses receive the same punishment. Thus, victim organizations consider the perpetrator’s status when 
pursuing an outcome in occupational fraud cases.  
[Insert Table 4 - 6 and Figure 4 - 4 here] 
Finally, we test hypothesis 3 (H3), which examines whether the main effect of fraud severity on 
fraud outcomes is moderated by the type of the victim organization. In other words, we examine 
whether the positive association between fraud severity and fraud outcome is moderated by the 




Model 3:  
Fraud Outcome = α + β1*FR_DURATION + β2*FR_AMOUNT + β3*FR_TYPE + β4*COLLUSION + 
β5*AGE + β6*TENURE + β7*GENDER + β8*POSITION + β9*EDUCATION + 
β10*PRIORCHARG + β11*ORG_TYPE + β12*ORG_SIZE + β13*INDUSTRY + 
β14*ANTIFRAUD + β15*ORG_LOC + β16 *ORG_TYPE*FR_DURATION + 
β17*ORG_TYPE*FR_AMOUNT + β18*ORG_TYPE*COLLUSION + 
β19*ORG_TYPE*FR_TYPE + ε 
Table 4 - 7 reports the results from our multinomial logistic regression, which we detail in 
Model 3. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the coefficients of the fraud severity 
indicators interact with the organization type. When comparing the odds of no outcome to 
termination, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE*FR_DURATION (β16) is positive and significantly 
different from zero. More specifically, the coefficient of Governmental*FR_DURATION is + 0.06 (two-
tailed p < 0.01), the coefficient of Non-Profit*FR_DURATION is +0.06 (two-tailed p < 0.01), and the 
coefficient of Private*FR_DURATION is + 0.04 (two-tailed p < 0.01), as compared to publicly traded 
organizations, the reference category.  
When comparing the odds of termination to termination and criminal prosecution, the 
coefficient of ORG_TYPE*FR_DURATION (β16) is significant only for governmental organizations, 
specifically, the coefficient of Governmental*FR_DURATION is +0.02 (two-tailed p < 0.1). Figure 4 - 5 
shows the graphic representation of the fraud duration and organization type interaction.  As the fraud 
duration increases, not-for-profit organizations are more likely to pursue no outcome than to terminate the 
perpetrator, as compared to publicly traded companies. Thus, as the fraud severity increases, the not-for-
profit organizations tend not to pursue any outcome against the principal perpetrator. Conversely, as fraud 
duration increases, governmental and privately held organizations are more likely to terminate the 
perpetrators than pursue no outcome and to terminate and prosecute than just terminate, as compared to 
publicly traded companies. Thus, as the fraud severity increases, governmental and privately held 
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organizations are more likely to pursue a harsher outcome. As Figure 4 - 6 shows, there is a positive 
relationship between the fraud severity and punishment severity when the victim organization is either a 
governmental entity or a privately held company, as compared to publicly traded companies.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 - 5 and Figure 4 - 6 here] 
 
Further, the results in Table 4 - 7 indicate a significant interaction between the organization 
type and fraud amount, ORG_TYPE*FR_AMOUNT (β17). In comparing the odds of receiving no 
outcome and being terminated, the coefficient of governmental*FR_AMOUNT is negative (- 0.24) and 
significantly different from zero (two-tailed p < 0.1), whereas in comparing the odds of being terminated 
to being terminated and criminally prosecuted, the coefficient of not-for-profit*FR_AMOUNT is positive 
(+ 0.46) and significantly different from zero (two-tailed p < 0.01). Figure 4 - 7 shows the interaction 
between the organization type (ORG_TYPE) and fraud amount (FR_AMOUNT). As the amount of the 
misappropriated assets (i.e. fraud severity) increases, the probability that a governmental organization does 
not pursue any outcome decreases, as compared to publicly traded organizations. In contrast, Figure 4 - 8 
shows that not-for profit organizations are more likely than publicly traded organizations to terminate and 
criminally prosecute perpetrators as the number of misappropriated assets increases.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 - 7 and Figure 4 - 8 here] 
 Lastly, the results in Table 4 - 7 report a significant interaction between    
ORG_TYPE*COLLUSION (β18) and ORG_TYPE*FR_TYPE (β19) when comparing the probability of 
being terminated to being terminated and criminally prosecuted. The coefficient of 
governmental*COLLUSION is negative (- 0.12) and significantly different from zero (two-tailed p < 0.1), 
and the coefficient of governmental*FR_TYPE is negative (- 1.13) and significantly different from zero 
(two-tailed p < 0.1). Figure 4 - 9 shows that as the number of perpetrators involved in the fraud increases, 
120 
 
governmental organizations are less likely to terminate and criminally persecute the principal perpetrators 
as compared to publicly traded organizations. Figure 4 - 10 shoes that governmental organizations are less 
likely to terminate and criminally prosecute the principal perpetrator in fraud cases that involve assets 
misappropriation than in other fraud cases when compared to publicly traded organizations.  
[Insert Figure 4 - 9, Figure 4 - 10 and Table 4 - 7 here] 
5.0 CONLUSION 
When high-profile fraud cases were detected in early 2000s, organizations, victim to these 
fraud schemes, rushed to replace their top executives. Some executives resigned voluntarily while 
others were terminated. There was also a group of organizations which did not pursue any outcome 
against their top executives. This evidence indicate that organizations, victimized by these frauds, 
choose whether and how to punish fraudsters. In this study, we examine whether the victim 
organization’s decision to pursue an outcome against their executives is affected by the severity of 
fraud, by the perpetrator’s status and by the type of the organization.  
We find that as fraud severity increases, the severity of the outcome pursued against the 
principal perpetrator increases as well. However, victim organizations pursue less severe outcomes 
against high status perpetrators, as compared to low status perpetrators in fraud cases with a short 
duration. As the fraud duration increases, however, victim organizations pursue equally severe 
outcomes against all perpetrators. Lastly, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held 
organizations are more likely to pursue no outcome against principal perpetrators as compared to 
publicly traded organizations. However, governmental and not-for-profit organizations are more 
likely to terminate and criminally prosecute the principal perpetrators as compared to just 
termination. Thus, governmental and not-for-profit organizations decide to pursue the two extreme 
outcomes against the fraudsters, i.e. no outcome at all or termination and criminal prosecution. 
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The findings of this study shed light on the multitude of factors that affect the outcomes pursued 
against the occupational fraud perpetrators. We conclude that the fraud outcome is determined not 
only by the severity of the fraud act, but also by the status of the perpetrator who committed the 
fraud and the type of the victim organization.  
Our study contributes to criminology and white-collar crime literature by being the first to 
consider the perpetrator’s status characteristics and the victim organization type as moderators to 
the relationship between crime severity and punishment severity. It further adds to occupational 
fraud literature in accounting by providing a context to the descriptive data in the ACFE’s Report 
to the Nations.  Our study further offers anti-fraud professionals, such as forensic accounting and 
fraud examination professionals, an insight into the interactions between the fraud scheme 
attributes and victim and perpetrator characteristics. This information may aid them in the design 
of internal controls or when advising victim organization clients. As such, our study has both 
research and practical implications. 
As with any archival study, there are several limitations to this study. First, civil litigation 
is not examined as a possible fraud outcome due to data availability. Anecdotally, civil litigation 
is less common than criminal prosecution; however, it is still pursued in a considerable number of 
occupational fraud cases. Second, certain observations are deleted as the responses of the CFEs 
were contradictory or incomplete. For instance, when asked about the actions taken against the 
principal perpetrator, both probation/suspension and termination are selected. We cannot 
determine whether this is by mistake or by choice when the perpetrator is initially suspended and 
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Variable Measurement ACFE survey 
Question 
DV - Dependent variable  
Termination Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the perpetrator no longer 





Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the fraud case was referred 
to law enforcement for criminal prosecution, and 0 otherwise 
Q75 
Fraud Outcome  It equals 0 if no outcome was pursued, i.e. the perpetrator was not 
terminated and was not criminally prosecuted, 1 if termination only 
was pursued, 2 if termination and criminal prosecution was 
pursued.  
Q74/Q75 
IV- Fraud Severity  
Fraud Duration 
(FR_DURATION) 
The number of months that the scheme had been ongoing before it 




Natural logarithm of the total dollar value of the amount of assets 
that was misappropriated, or the amount of loss caused.   
Q2 
Fraud Type        
(FR_TYPE) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraud scheme involved asset 




The number of perpetrators involved in the fraud scheme.  Q59 
IV- Perpetrator Status  
Age 
(AGE) 





Indicator variable equal 1 if the principal perpetrator had worked 
for the victim organization less than five years at the time 
occupational fraud occurred, and 0 if s/he had worked for more 




It equals 1 if perpetrator is a male and 0 if s/he is a female. Q65 
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The perpetrator position is measured at three levels: employee, 





Indicator variable equal to 1 if the principal perpetrator’s education 
equals some college education or more, and 0 otherwise, i.e. the 




Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the perpetrators has received 
prior fraud-related charges, and 0 otherwise.  
Q69 
IV- Victim Organization Type  
Organization Type 
(ORG_TYPE) 
The type of organization is measured at four levels: governmental 
agency, publicly traded company, privately held company and not-
for-profit organization. 
Q45 
CV – Control Variables  
Organization Size 
(ORG_SIZE) 





The following industries are examined: banking/financial services, 
manufacturing, public services (includes government and public 
administration, religious, charitable, social services), customer 





Total number of antifraud measures that victim organizations had 





Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the victim organization is in 















































Figure 4 - 3: Graph Theoretic Representation of one Actor Salient 
Diffuse (D) and Specific (C) Status Characteristic in an RET Setting.  
 
 (Adapted from Dilks, L. M., McGrimmon, T. S., & Thye, S. R. (2017). Assessing the Impact of 
Status Information Conveyance on the Distribution of Negative Rewards: A Preliminary Test and 























































































































































Figure 4 - 10: Graphing Interaction – Pr (Termination and Criminal Prosecution) 
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Table 4 - 1: Full Sample – Descriptive Statistics 
     N = 2,096 
      Freq. Mean Median Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
Fraud severity               
  FR_DURATION     25.6 18.0 1.0 120.0 24.4 
  FR_AMOUNT     12.1 12.2 4.8 19.1 2.2 
  COLLUSION     2.4 1.0 1.0 27.0 2.8 
  FR_TYPE:   Obs. %         
  AM   1,860 88.7         
  Non-AM   236 11.3         
Perpetrator Status               
  AGE     41.5 40.0 18.0 71.0 9.6 
  TENURE:   Obs. %         
  Less than 5 years   1,005 47.9         
  More than 5 years   1,091 52.1         
                  
  GENDER:               
  Male   1,355 64.6         
  Female   741 35.4         
  POSITION:               
  Employee   899 42.9         
  Manager   830 39.6         
  Executive   367 17.5         
  EDUCATION:               
  HS or less   632 30.2         
  
Some college or 
more   
1,464 69.8         
  PRIORCHARG:                
  Yes   230 11.0         
  No   1,866 89.0         
 
Victim Organization Type   
            
  ORG_TYPE:   Obs. %         
  Publicly traded   645 30.8         
  Privately held   891 42.5         
  Governmental   328 15.6         
  Not-for-profit   232 11.1         
 
Control Variables   
            
  ORG_SIZE     18.2 18.1 4.6 32.6 3.5 
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  ANTIFRAUD     7.3 7.0 0.0 18.0 4.9 
  INDUSTRY:   Obs. %         
  Banking   380 18.1         
  Manufacturing   305 14.6         
  Public Service   261 12.5         
  Customer Service   598 28.5         
  Others   552 26.3         
  LOCATION:               
  US firms   1,240 59.2         
  Non-US firms   856 40.8         
_____________________________ 
Variable Definitions:  
FR_DURATION = number of months that the scheme had been ongoing before it was detected 
FR_AMOUNT = natural logarithm of the total dollar value of the number of misappropriated assets 
or the amount of the caused loss    
FR_TYPE = indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraud scheme involved asset misappropriation and 
0 otherwise   
COLLUSION = number of perpetrators involved in the fraud scheme  
AGE = Age of the principal perpetrator in years at the time of the occupational fraud 
TENURE = Indicator variable equal 1 if the principal perpetrator had worked for the victim 
organization less than five years at the time occupational fraud occurred, and 0 if s/he had worked 
for more than five years    
GENDER = It equals 1 if perpetrator is a male and 0 if s/he is a female 
POSITION = The perpetrator position is measured at three levels: employee, manager (includes 
supervisor), and executive (includes owner and officer) 
EDUCATION = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the principal perpetrator’s education equals some 
college or even higher education, and 0 otherwise, i.e. if the perpetrator has high school or lower 
education 
 PRIORCHARG = Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the perpetrator received prior fraud-
related charges and 0 otherwise 
ORG_TYPE = The type of the organization is measured at four levels: governmental agency, 
publicly traded company, privately held company, and not-for-profit organization. 
ORG_SIZE = Natural logarithm of the victim organization’s approximate gross annual revenue 
INDUSTRY = The following industries are examined: banking/financial services, manufacturing, 
public services (includes government and public administration, religious, charitable, social 
services), customer service (includes transportation and warehousing), and others. 
ANTIFRAUD = Total number of antifraud measures that victim organizations had in place at the 
time that occupational fraud occurred 
ORG_LOC = Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the victim organization is in the United States 




Table 4 - 2: Descriptive Statistics by Outcome Type 
                                  
      No Punishment   Termination Only   Termination and Criminal Prosecution 
      (n = 217)   (n = 535)   (n = 1,344)   
      
Freq. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
  Freq. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 




Fraud severity                                 
  FR_DURATION     24.5 16.0 25.8     20.9 14.0 20.2     27.7 20.0 25.4   
  FR_AMOUNT     11.4 11.2 2.5     11.6 11.5 2.2     12.4 12.4 2.1   
  COLLUSION     2.4 2.0 2.3     2.4 2.0 2.6     2.4 1.0 2.9   
  FR_TYPE:   Obs. %       Obs. %       Obs. %       
  AM   188 86.6       426 79.6       1,246 92.7       
  Non-AM   29 13.4       109 20.4       98 7.3       
                                    
Perpetrator Status                                 
  AGE     45.0 45.0 9.7     41.2 40.0 8.9     41.0 40.0 9.7   
  TENURE:   Obs. %       Obs. %       Obs. %       
  Less than 5 years   81 37.3       249 46.5       675 50.2       
  More than 5 years   136 62.7       286 53.5       669 49.8       
                                    
  GENDER:                                 
  Male   164 75.6       414 77.4       777 57.8       
  Female   53 24.4       121 22.6       567 42.2       
  POSITION:                                 
  Employee   58 26.7       201 37.6       640 47.6       
  Manager   94 43.3       234 43.7       502 37.4       
  Executive   65 30.0       100 18.7       202 15.0       
                   
           (continued on next page)     
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  EDUCATION:                                 
  HS or less   47 21.7       117 21.9       468 34.8       
  
Some college or 
more   
170 78.3       418 78.1       876 65.2       
  PRIORCHARG:                                  
  Yes   15 6.9       27 5.0       188 14.0       
  No   202 93.1       508 95.0       1,156 86.0       
                                    
Victim Organization Type                    
  ORG_TYPE:   Obs. %       Obs. %       Obs. %         
  Publicly traded   35 16.1       219 40.9       391 29.1         
  Privately held   108 49.8       221 41.3       562 41.8         
  Governmental   45 20.7       51 9.5       232 17.3         
  Not-for-profit   29 13.4       44 8.2       159 11.8         
                     
Control Variables                                   
  ORG_SIZE     17.3 16.8 3.3     18.5 18.6 3.5     18.2 18.0 3.5     
  ANTIFRAUD     6.3 6.0 4.6     8.1 8.0 4.6     7.1 7.0 5.1     
  INDUSTRY:   Obs. %       Obs. %       Obs. %         
  Banking   22 10.1       80 15.0       278 20.7         
  Manufacturing   39 18.0       113 21.1       153 11.4         
  Public Service   40 18.4       44 8.2       177 13.2         
  Customer Service   64 29.5       142 26.5       392 29.2         
  Others   52 24.0       156 29.2       344 25.6         
  LOCATION:                                   
  US firms   118 54.4       247 46.2       875 65.1         
  Non-US firms   99 45.6       288 53.8       469 34.9         
______________________________ 




Table 4 - 3: Pearson (Upper)/ Spearman (Lower) Correlation Coefficients  
(n = 2,096) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1   0.36** 0.02 0.00 0.34** 0.36** -0.08** 0.17** -0.01 0.00 -0.11** 0.04 0.05* 0.05* 
2 0.42**   -0.15** 0.22** 0.29** 0.18** 0.16** 0.33** -0.18** 0.00 0.06** 0.08** -0.10** -0.10** 
3 0.02 -0.13**   -0.09** -0.02 -0.03 -0.14** -0.09** 0.12** 0.06** -0.08** 0.01 0.08** 0.02 
4 0.02 0.30** -0.12**   0.04 0.05* 0.17** 0.11** -0.07** -0.02 0.11** -0.08** -0.07** 0.02 
5 0.37** 0.30** -0.02 0.08**   0.39** 0.08** 0.40** -0.09** -0.02 -0.11** -0.01 0.05* 0.11** 
6 0.37** 0.18** -0.03 0.07** 0.39**   0.03 0.18** -0.01 -0.12** -0.02 -0.05* -0.01 0.17** 
7 -0.08** 0.16** -0.14** 0.25** 0.09** 0.03   0.28** -0.24** -0.09** 0.12** -0.01 -0.09** -0.07** 
8 0.21** 0.32** -0.09** 0.21** 0.41** 0.18** 0.28**   -0.29** -0.05* -0.07** 0.08** 0.02 -0.04 
9 -0.03 -0.18** 0.12** -0.11** -0.09** -0.01 -0.24** -0.29**   0.11** -0.06** 0.04 -0.01 0.03 
10 -0.01 0.00 0.06** -0.04 -0.02 -0.12** -0.09** -0.06** 0.11**   -0.09** 0.05* 0.04 0.01 
11 -0.11** 0.05* -0.08** 0.12** -0.10** -0.02 0.12** -0.06** -0.06** -0.09**   -0.57** -0.24** -0.28** 
12 0.04 0.09** 0.01 -0.07** -0.02 -0.05* -0.01 0.07** 0.04 0.05* -0.57**   -0.30** -0.37** 
13 0.05* -0.10** 0.08** -0.09** 0.05* -0.01 -0.09** 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.24** -0.30**   -0.15** 
14 0.05* -0.10** 0.02 0.02 0.11** 0.11** -0.07** -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.29** -0.37** -0.15**   
_______________________________________________________ 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 







1 = FR_DURATION 
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2 = FR_AMOUNT 
3 = FR_TYPE 
4 = COLLUSION 
5 = AGE 
6 = TENURE 
7 = GENDER 
8 = POSITION 
9 = EDUCATION 
10 = PRIORCHARG 
11 = PUBLICLY TRADED 
12 = PRIVATELY HELD 
13 = NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
14 = GOVERNMENTAL 
     










Table 4 - 4: Multinomial Logit Regression for Outcome Pursued and Fraud Severity, Perpetrator 
Status and Victim Organization Type.  
(n = 2,096) 
 No Outcome  Termination and Criminal prosecution 
Variables B SE OR 95% CI  B SE OR 95% CI 




   
   
   
  
Fraud Duration 0.00 0.00 1.00 [0.99, 1.01]  0.01 0.00 1.01** [1.00, 1.01] 
Fraud Amount -0.08 0.05 0.93 [0.84, 1.02]  0.37 0.03 1.44*** [1.35, 1.54] 
Collusion 0.03 0.03 1.03 [0.97, 1.10]  0.01 0.02 1.01 [0.97, 1.06] 
Fraud Type (AM) 0.27 0.24 1.31 [0.81, 2.11]  1.16 0.17 3.19*** [2.28, 4.46] 
Perpetrator Status 
   
  
 
   
  
Age 0.03 0.01 1.03*** [1.01, 1.05]  -0.02 0.01 0.98** [0.97, 1.00] 
Tenure (less than 5 years) -0.17 0.19 0.84 [0.58, 1.22]  0.28 0.13 1.33** [1.03, 1.71] 
Gender (Male) -0.003 0.21 1.00 [0.66, 1.51]  -0.59 0.14 0.55*** [0.42, 0.72] 
Position:    
  
 
   
  
Employee -0.43 0.28 0.65 [0.38, 1.12]  0.60 0.20 1.83*** [1.25, 2.68] 
Manager -0.19 0.23 0.83 [0.53, 1.29]  0.42 0.17 1.52** [1.09, 2.13] 
Education (Some college or 
more) 
0.02 0.22 1.02 
[0.67, 1.55] 
 
-0.52 0.14 0.59*** 
[0.45, 0.78] 
Prior Charges (Charged) 0.28 0.34 1.32 [0.67, 2.58]  0.95 0.23 2.59*** [1.65, 4.05] 
Victim Organization Type 
   
  
 
   
  
Organization Type:    
  
 
   
  
Governmental 1.19 0.35 3.30*** [1.66, 6.55]  0.96 0.24 2.62*** [1.63, 4.22] 
Not-for-profit 0.86 0.36 2.37** [1.16, 4.82]  0.58 0.25 1.78** [1.10, 2.88] 
Privately held 0.84 0.24 2.32*** [1.44, 3.75]  0.23 0.15 1.26 [0.94, 1.67] 
Control Variables    
  
 
   
  
Organization Size -0.04 0.03 0.96 [0.91, 1.02]  -0.02 0.02 0.98 [0.94, 1.02] 
Anti-fraud measures -0.03 0.02 0.97 [0.93, 1.01]  0.01 0.01 1.01 [0.98, 1.04] 
US firms (US) 0.03 0.19 1.03 [0.72, 1.49]  0.68 0.13 1.97*** [1.54, 2.53] 
Industry:    
  
 
   
  
Banking -0.01 0.30 0.99 [0.55, 1.78]  0.55 0.18 1.73*** [1.21, 2.48] 
Manufacturing 0.11 0.26 1.12 [0.66, 1.88]  -0.48 0.19 0.62*** [0.43, 0.89] 
Public Services 0.28 0.32 1.32 [0.71, 2.48]  0.08 0.25 1.09 [0.67, 1.76] 
Others -0.11 0.24 0.90 [0.56, 1.44]  -0.07 0.16 0.93 [0.68, 1.28] 
____________________________ 
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, for the two-tailed test.  
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Table 4 - 5: P’s Aggregate Expectations  
Paths P’s Aggregate Expectation 
6 positive; 0 negative  0.9834 
5 positive; 1 negative 0.4722 
4 positive; 2 negative 0.19 
3 positive; 3 negative 0.00 
2 positive; 4 negative -0.19 
1 positive; 5 negative -0.4722 


















Table 4 - 6: Multinomial Logit Regression for Outcome Pursued and Fraud Severity, Perpetrator 
Status and Victim Organization Type.  
 No outcome  
Termination and criminal 
prosecution 
Variables B SE OR 95% CI  B SE OR 95% CI 
Intercept -0.44 0.92     -4.50 0.61    
Fraud severity  
 
    
  
   
Fraud Duration 0.00 0.01 1.00 [0.99, 1.01]  0.00 0.00 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] 
Fraud Amount -0.06 0.06 0.94 [0.83, 1.06]  0.35 0.04 1.42*** [1.32, 1.54, 
Collusion 0.02 0.04 1.02 [0.94, 1.11]  
-0.02 0.03 0.98 [0.94, 1.04] 
Fraud Type (AM) 0.12 0.36 1.13 [0.56, 2.29]  1.16 0.23 3.20*** [2.05, 4.97] 
Perpetrator Status  
    
  
    
Status -0.10 1.30 0.91 [0.07, 11.48]  -1.99 1.00 0.14** [0.02, 0.97] 
Status*Fraud Duration 0.01 0.01 1.01 [0.99, 1.03]  0.02 0.01 1.02*** [1.01, 1.03] 
Status*Fraud Amount 0.03 0.10 1.03 [0.84, 1.25]  -0.01 0.07 0.99 [0.86, 1.15] 
Status*Collusion 0.01 0.07 1.01 [0.88, 1.17]  0.07 0.05 1.08 [0.97, 1.19] 
Status*Fraud Type 0.49 0.59 1.63 [0.51, 5.22]  0.12 0.43 1.12 [0.48, 2.62] 
Victim Organization 
Complexity  
    
  
    
Organization Type:  
    
  
    
Government 1.29 0.35 3.62*** [1.83, 7.16]  1.00 0.24 2.73*** [1.70, 4.37] 
Not-for-profit 0.96 0.36 2.62*** [1.29, 5.29]  0.55 0.24 1.73** [1.08, 2.79] 
Privately held 0.87 0.24 2.39*** [1.48, 3.85]  0.24 0.14 1.27 [0.95, 1.68] 
Control Variables 
     
 
     
Organization Size -0.04 0.03 0.96 [0.91, 1.02]  -0.02 0.02 0.98 [0.95, 1.02] 
Anti-fraud measures -0.04 0.02 0.96* [0.92, 1.01]  0.01 0.01 1.01 [0.98, 1.04] 
US firms (US) 0.13 0.18 1.14 [0.80, 1.62]  0.71 0.12 2.03*** [1.60, 2.58] 
Industry:  
    
  
    
Banking -0.09 0.30 0.91 [0.51, 1.65]  0.51 0.18 1.66*** [1.16, 2.38] 
Manufacturing 0.07 0.27 1.07 [0.63, 1.80]  -0.47 0.18 0.63** [0.44, 0.90] 
Public Services 0.23 0.32 1.26 [0.67, 2.36]  0.06 0.25 1.06 [0.65, 1.72] 
Others -0.12 0.24 0.88 [0.55, 1.41]  -0.06 0.16 0.95 [0.69, 1.29] 
____________________________ 





Table 4 - 7: Multinomial Logit Regression for Outcome Pursued and Fraud Severity, Perpetrator Status and Victim Organization 
Type.  
 No Outcome 
 Termination and criminal prosecution 
Variables B SE OR 95% CI  B SE OR 95% CI 
Intercept -1.80 1.51     -4.22 0.87    
Fraud severity            
Fraud Duration -0.04 0.02 0.96*** [0.93, 0.99]  0.00 0.00 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] 
Fraud Amount -0.01 0.10 0.99 [0.81, 1.21]  0.36 0.05 1.43*** [1.28, 1.59] 
Collusion 0.02 0.07 1.02 [0.89, 1.17] 
 0.05 0.03 1.06* [0.99, 1.13] 
Fraud Type (AM) 0.73 0.54 2.07 [0.71, 6.02]  1.14 0.27 3.11*** [1.85, 5.24] 
Governmental *Fraud Duration 0.06 0.02 1.06*** [1.02, 1.10]  0.02 0.01 1.02* [1.00, 1.04] 
Non-Profit * Fraud Duration 0.06 0.02 1.06*** [1.02, 1.10]  -0.01 0.01 0.99 [0.97, 1.02] 
Private*Fraud Duration 0.04 0.02 1.04*** [1.01, 1.08]  0.01 0.01 1.01 [1.00, 1.02] 
Governmental * Fraud Amount -0.24 0.14 0.78* [0.59, 1.04]  -0.07 0.09 0.93 [0.78, 1.11] 
Non-Profit * Fraud Amount -0.27 0.19 0.76 [0.53, 1.10]  0.46 0.15 1.59*** [1.18, 2.15] 
Private * Fraud Amount 0.03 0.12 1.04 [0.82, 1.31]  -0.03 0.07 0.97 [0.85, 1.12] 
Governmental * Collusion 0.01 0.09 1.01 [0.84, 1.22]  -0.12 0.06 0.89* [0.79, 1.00] 
Non-Profit * Collusion 0.22 0.19 1.25 [0.87, 1.80]  -0.02 0.16 0.98 [0.72, 1.34] 
Private * Collusion -0.03 0.09 0.97 [0.82, 1.15]  -0.06 0.05 0.94 [0.85, 1.03] 
Governmental * Fraud Type -0.82 0.91 0.44 [0.07, 2.61]  -1.13 0.61 0.32* [0.10, 1.07] 
Non-Profit * Fraud Type -1.65 1.19 0.19 [0.02, 1.99]  -0.73 1.02 0.48 [0.07, 3.57] 
Private * Fraud Type -0.49 0.63 0.61 [0.18, 2.10]  0.38 0.38 1.46 [0.69, 3.09] 
Perpetrator Status 
           
Age 0.03 0.01 1.04*** [1.01, 1.06]  -0.02 0.01 0.98** [0.97, 1.00] 
Tenure (less than 5 years) -0.13 0.19 0.88 [0.60, 1.27]  0.31 0.13 1.37** [1.06, 1.76] 




           
Employee -0.38 0.28 0.69 [0.40, 1.19] 
 0.61 0.20 1.85*** [1.25, 2.73] 
Manager -0.14 0.23 0.87 [0.56, 1.37] 
 0.43 0.17 1.53** [1.09, 2.16] 
Education (Some college or more) 0.04 0.22 1.04 [0.68, 1.59]  -0.53 0.14 0.59*** [0.45, 0.77] 
Prior Charges (Charged) 0.28 0.35 1.33 [0.67, 2.63] 
 0.98 0.23 2.66*** [1.69, 4.20] 
Victim Organization Complexity 
           
Organization Type: 
           
Governmental 3.46 1.85 31.90* [0.84, 1209.84] 2.70 1.24 14.82** [1.31, 167.85] 
Not-for-profit 3.70 2.22 40.60* [0.52, 3146.78] -3.57 1.84 0.03* [0.00, 1.03] 
Privately held 0.12 1.55 1.13 [0.05, 23.42]  0.24 0.94 1.27 [0.20, 8.03] 
Control Variables 
           
Organization Size -0.04 0.03 0.96 [0.90, 1.02]  -0.02 0.02 0.98 [0.95, 1.02] 
Anti-fraud measures -0.03 0.02 0.97 [0.93, 1.02]  0.01 0.02 1.01 [0.98, 1.04] 
US firms (US) 0.02 0.19 1.02 [0.70, 1.48]  0.67 0.13 1.95*** [1.52, 2.50] 
Industry:            
Banking -0.11 0.31 0.90 [0.49, 1.64]  0.53 0.19 1.70*** [1.18, 2.45] 
Manufacturing 0.12 0.27 1.12 [0.67, 1.90]  -0.44 0.19 0.64** [0.45, 0.93] 
Public Services 0.29 0.33 1.34 [0.69, 2.58]  0.06 0.26 1.07 [0.65, 1.76] 
Others -0.16 0.24 0.86 [0.53, 1.38]  -0.09 0.16 0.91 [0.67, 1.25] 
____________________________ 





CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examines the broad and complex topic of occupational fraud which has 
implications for the accounting research and practice. The first study concentrates on the pre-fraud 
period whereas the remaining two studies focus on the post-fraud period. More specifically, the 
first study examines the role of executive compensation, in the years leading up to fraud detection, 
in perpetrator’s decision to commit fraud, and the other two studies examine the regulatory entities’ 
findings against perpetrators and victim organizations’ outcome against principal perpetrators after 
fraud is detected. 
  The first study examines the association between executive compensation and financial 
statement fraud. We find evidences that fraud firms prefer to pay their executives with higher 
levels of equity compensation years before the beginning of the misreporting period. The 
difference in equity compensation is driven almost entirely by option grants specifically. These 
differences begin in the first year of an executive’s tenure and remain over their tenure at the firm. 
Our results suggest that both firm-level and executive-level compensation preferences combined 
with the idiosyncratic portfolio management all contribute jointly to an increased reporting risk. 
These findings contribute to prior literature by replicating their compensation differences between 
misreporting and control firms. Further, it provides insight into how these compensation 
differences developed in the years leading up to the fraud. It also contributes to practitioners by 
suggesting that the reporting risk could be reduced by encouraging executives to diversify their 
portfolios throughout their tenure as their firm-based wealth increases from accumulated 
compensation over time. 
The second study examines the accountability framework employed by the SEC in their 
auditor related findings. More specifically, it examines the association of fraud characteristics and 
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the SEC’s auditor related findings. The results indicate a weak association between the fraud 
characteristics and the SEC’s findings, but a strong association between Big N auditor and the 
SEC’s finding. Therefore, the evidences are more consistent with a process-reward accountability 
framework than an outcome-penalty accountability framework. This conclusion speaks to 
independent auditors who are constantly managing auditing risk. It indicates that audit process 
matters more than the audit outcome. The findings also contribute to accounting literature as this 
study examines three different auditor related findings unlike prior literature which examines only 
two.  
The third study examines the outcomes pursued by the victim organizations against the 
principal perpetrators in occupational fraud cases. We conclude that the fraud outcome is 
determined not only by the severity of the fraud act, but also by who committed the act and who 
the victim is. This study contributes not only to the accounting literature but also to criminology 
literature by considering the perpetrator’s status characteristics and the victim organization type as 
moderators to the relationship between crime severity and punishment severity. It also offers anti-
fraud professionals, such as forensic accounting and fraud examination professionals, an insight 
into the factors they would consider before advising their clients on what outcome to pursue against 
principal perpetrators. This information may also aid victim organization firms in the design of 
their internal controls. 
Occupational fraud still prevails in the business world and results in severe consequences 
not only to the fraud victims but also for the fraud perpetrators. This dissertation aims at providing 
a better understanding of the broad topic of occupational fraud in order to benefit both the academic 
researchers and the practitioners.   
 
